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Conclusion ................................................................. 519
“In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”1

Rights activists have been fighting for decades to extend
constitutional rights–particularly due process rights–to immigrants
facing detention and deportation to little avail.2 Their successes,
while important (and despite commentary to the contrary), have
done little more than dent Congress’ seemingly indestructible
plenary power over immigration.3 Congress’ powers to place the
burden of proof on the detainee to show she should be released or
even to order detention without a hearing, for example, remain
intact although neither is constitutionally permissible for any other
form of detention, including detention of enemy combatants.4 The
Supreme Court at times seems sympathetic to the obvious injustice
in failing to fully extend constitutional rights to immigration
proceedings, given their consequences, but believes its hands are
tied by more than a century of precedent it used to guarantee full
federal control over an area of law and policy that was originally
shared with the states.5 The Constitution’s failure to specifically
enumerate immigration as a federal power required the Court to

*This Article originated from a project prepared for the Southern Poverty Law Center’s
Southeast Immigrant Freedom Initiative examining how the Supreme Court justified
differential treatment of immigrant detainees when compared to all other detainees. I want
to thank Sherry Edwards for her invaluable research and assistance in that project. I would
also like to thank Matthew Lindsay not only for your comments on a draft of this paper
but for your research that ultimately sparked this paper. Finally, thank you Michael Perry,
Daniel Werner and Ravi Nessman for your comments on various drafts and your support.
All mistakes are mine.
1 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
79-80 (1976)).
2 See discussion infra Part III(C).
3 See id.
4 See Demore, 538 U.S. at 518-19 (allowing for mandatory detention of immigrants
in immigration proceedings); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)
(setting standards for pretrial detention); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81-82
(1992) (setting standards for mental health detention); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 33 (2008) (setting standards for enemy combatant detention).
5 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-88 (1952); see also Galvan v.
Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954).
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identify a source for that exclusive power.6 It landed on
international law’s sovereignty rights, which at the time were
absolute, with a little help from foreign affairs and national security
powers that, depending on the Court opinion or scholar, may or may
not arise from the Constitution.7 The Court then used the sources of
power to justify Congressional plenary power over immigration.8
The Supreme Court initially shielded this newly exclusive federal
power from constitutional or international law oversight by deeming
immigration a foreign affairs and national security matter and
therefore a wholly political question.9 It has since implemented
some judicial review, but only after granting extraordinary
deference to Congress and, by delegation, the Executive because of
what it perceives as the political nature of immigration powers.10 It
has used muddied and muddled jurisprudence to almost wholly
avoid the nearly century of evolution of international and
constitutional law that would undo the worst of immigration law
and policy’s injustices. In doing so, it has effectively given the
federal government permission to “make rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”11
Neither international law nor Supreme Court jurisprudence on
foreign affairs and national security powers provide support for the
continuation of Congressional plenary power over immigration or
the extraordinary deference it grants the federal government in the
area of immigration.12 A dive into international law shows that
sovereignty rights–or what the Court terms “inherent sovereignty”–
are no longer absolute, and questions of immigrants’ rights are
explicitly a legal, not political, matter.13 After World War II, the
international community, including the United States, adopted
human rights expressly to limit sovereignty rights to protect
individuals from abusive and arbitrary government behavior and

6 See DANIEL WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE: IN A NUTSHELL 53-54 (5th ed. 2005).
7 See id. at 54-60.
8 See id. at 54-60.
9 See id. at 57.
10 See id. at 70-82.
11 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
12 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792 (1977); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2418 (2018).
13 See discussion infra Part IV(B).
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guaranteed a legal remedy in domestic courts for any rights
violations.14 A dive into Supreme Court jurisprudence also shows
that while Congress and the Executive benefit from deference in
foreign affairs and national security matters, that deference need not
be so extreme–a point the Court clarified when it thwarted the
Executive’s efforts to claim similarly extraordinary deference over
its treatment of enemy combatants after 9/11.15 Yet, Congressional
plenary power over immigration remains justified by absolute
sovereignty, and otherwise “unacceptable rules” remain subject to
only minimal judicial review because of their political nature. At
this point, the Supreme Court’s continued reliance on absolute
sovereignty and extraordinary deference to prop up an unjust
immigration system is little more than rote recitation of case law
from a bygone era, rather than a considered judgment of what
international law and foreign affairs and national security powers
permit when the government exercises its power to control
immigration. The Supreme Court, effectively, is allowing nothing
more than the weight of precedence to override the sources of power
and shield unjust immigration law and policy from appropriate
judicial review.
This Article proposes that immigrant rights activists could pose
a more effective challenge to unjust immigration law and policy by
taking direct, textual aim at the two crumbling pillars of
Congressional plenary power. In its post-World War II plenary
power decisions, the Supreme Court seems to assume Congress has
the power to pick and choose whether international law applies to
immigration proceedings based on the Constitution’s federal treaty
powers. It neither examines what it means to claim international
law as a source of power or reconsiders whether international law
continues to support Congressional plenary power and the rights
violations that power justifies. The Court’s failure to apply
international human rights law to Congress’ immigration powers is
the equivalent of failing to apply a constitutional amendment to the
very government behavior the amendment was designed to check.
The Court also has failed to reconsider its policy of extraordinary
deference to the political branches over immigration even as it has
refused to employ that level of deference to wartime decisionmaking, which is much more closely tied to foreign affairs and
14
15

See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 135-36 (2d ed. 2001).
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580-86 (2004).
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national security powers than immigration. This failure leads to the
absurd result that in some important aspects noncitizens facing
immigration proceedings receive fewer due process protections than
enemy combatants bent on the destruction of the United States.
Rather than tying ourselves up in jurisprudential knots to find
constitutional rights justifications for judicial protection of
immigrant rights, this Article looks to use the main sources of
immigration power–international law and foreign affairs and
national security powers–to finally topple Congressional plenary
power.
Part I begins by setting out a specific example of the problem
this Article seeks to address: the gross injustice of Congressional
plenary power over immigration. It details the United States’ law
and policy on immigration detention and compares it to the due
process and liberty standards that apply to all other forms of
nonpunitive detention in the United States to illustrate the otherwise
“unacceptable” rules Congressional plenary power allows the
government to make. This illustration then serves as a reference
point for understanding Congressional plenary power as
extraconstitutional and seemingly absolute and to highlight why it
is so essential to hold the government accountable for these rights
violations.
Part II then examines the origin of Congressional plenary power
to (1) establish why relying solely on constitutional arguments to
extend rights to immigrants in immigration proceedings may be an
impossible task; (2) to offer the background for the fundamental
inconsistencies in Supreme Court jurisprudence explored in Part IV;
and (3) to ultimately provide a sounder basis for challenging
Congress’ nearly absolute power. This part documents the
evolution of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that first recognized
the Constitution granted both the states and the federal government
the sovereign right to control immigration; to sole federal control
first under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, and then finally
under inherent sovereignty granted by international law, with some
added support from foreign affairs and national security powers.
Part III then explains how federal immigration powers became
relatively absolute. It examines the concept of absolute sovereignty
as well as the Court’s determination that foreign affairs and national
security matters, at least with respect to immigration law, are subject
to only the most minimal judicial review. With this knowledge,
immigration rights activists can build cogent legal arguments that
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are both loyal to the Supreme Court’s decisions on the source of
federal immigration powers but capable of exploiting the profound
weaknesses in how it maintains that power as nearly absolute.
The remainder of the Article identifies those jurisprudential
weaknesses.
Part IV begins by highlighting that inherent
sovereignty no longer means absolute sovereignty. Section A
articulates the post-World War II limits international law places on
the sovereign right to control immigration and underscores that the
United States has consented to these limits, which means the
judiciary must enforce them. It then spotlights the Supreme Court’s
anemic approach to what it means for international law to be a
source of power, which currently allows it to rhetorically claim
international law’s inherent sovereignty over immigration as equal
in authority to the Constitution, but still somehow subordinate
international law to federal statutes. Section B identifies the similar
incoherency in the Court’s unwillingness to revoke its extraordinary
deference to Congress and the Executive although foreign affairs
and national security powers no longer justify it under its
nonimmigration jurisprudence. All of this is to spotlight that the
Supreme Court has been derelict in its duty to protect immigrant
rights as required by international law and the foreign affairs and
national security powers that are the source of federal immigration
powers.
I. The Consequences of Congressional Plenary Power:
Immigration Detention
Part I examines how Congress uses its plenary power to grossly
violate the rights of immigrants with a Supreme Court stamp of
approval. It uses the example of immigration detention to expose
the naked injustice of subjecting immigration law and policy to only
the most minimal oversight. Detention inherently revokes a
person’s right to liberty. It makes it impossible for detainees to
work, to enjoy their families, or to move around freely, among
numerous other hardships. Congress has used its nearly absolute
power over immigration to deprive immigrants of their right to
liberty in a manner the Constitution would not allow, under any
circumstance, for citizens and even noncitizens facing detention in
other contexts–including during war.
The contrast between due process rights granted to immigrants
and all other non-criminally convicted detainees is stark. Pretrial
detention and mental health detention are governed by the
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Constitution and are granted full constitutional rights. Detention
during war for enemy combatants, which in the post-9/11 world
includes suspected terrorists, is governed by a combination of the
Constitution and International Humanitarian Law. In some
important respects, our Constitution provides people believed to be
intent on the destruction of the United States with greater rights than
those granted under immigration detention.16
To begin the comparison, it is important to understand the
differences and similarities between immigration detention and
other types of detention as they help explain some differences in
legal treatment as well as highlight the gross unfairness of
immigration detention. Pretrial detention shares the same grounds
for detention as immigration detention and, like immigration
detention, anticipates a short period of confinement before a final
resolution of the case.17 But, pretrial detention falls under criminal
law, which typically requires stricter standards of due process than
civil law, which governs immigration detention.18 Mental health
detention is also a form of civil detention, but shares only one of the
grounds for detention; it could be lifelong, and detainees, at least in
theory, receive a therapeutic benefit, which makes it less analogous
to immigration detention. Detention during war or insurrection
employs emergency powers to contain an impending threat
necessitated by situations not easily handled by the ordinary justice
system. In these urgent circumstances, due process requirements are
typically less than in ordinary times or for pretrial and mental health
detention. These differences should make wartime detention the
least analogous of the detention regimes to that of the immigration
detention regime, but wartime detention invokes the same foreign
affairs and national security powers that, in part, justify
Congressional plenary power over immigration, making it more

16 See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (discussing the
president’s power “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those . . . he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . on September
11, 2001”).
17 See
Pre Trial Detention Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/pre-trial-detention/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/EDC9-V7JE].
18 What Every Lawyer Needs to Know about Immigration Law, A.B.A. (June 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2017/june2017/immigration-law-basics-every-lawyer-should-know/
[https://perma.cc/LYR26DZK].
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analogous in practice. By comparing the due process rights of
immigrant detainees and all other detainees, Part I underscores the
stark discrimination underpinning the Supreme Court’s grant of
Congressional plenary power over immigration law and policy that
neither the Constitution nor international law otherwise permit.
Part I proceeds in three sections. Section A sets out the due
process requirements for the three forms of non-punitive detention
other than immigration detention practiced in the United States.
Section B then describes the Immigration and Nationality Act’s
detention scheme and the limited due process the proceedings
require. Section C concludes by comparing the differences in the
due process requirements between detention regimes to underscore
the disparity in standards between immigration detention and all
other forms of detention created by the Court’s choice to employ an
extraconstitutional source of federal power and then grant
extraordinary deference to the federal government when it employs
that power. In doing so, it highlights the myriad ways the Supreme
Court allows Congress and the Executive to grossly violate
immigrant rights.
A. Due Process Standards for Non-Immigration Detention
The underlying assumption contained in any Supreme Court
decision on the legality of detention and due process requirements
for detainees, outside of the immigration context, is the core belief
that: “‘[i]n our society liberty is the norm,’ and detention without
trial ‘is the carefully limited exception.’”19 The Court’s first
requirement for achieving that norm is to limit the grounds for
which a person may be detained.20 So far, the only acceptable
grounds for depriving a person of her liberty rights are that the
person is a threat to public safety or the continued existence of the
United States or is likely to flee rather than appear at future court
hearings or government proceedings.21
Where the justification for detention is public safety, the
Supreme Court limits detention to “to specially dangerous

19 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (superseded by statute) (quoting United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (superseded on other grounds)).
20 See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (holding that the
Bail Reform Act’s authorization of pretrial detention is not unconstitutional).
21 See 18 U.S.C. §3143(b)(1) (2018).
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individuals.”22 It has not established a baseline for what constitutes
“specially dangerous.”23 With that said, it approved a pretrial
detention statute in part because it “carefully limits the
circumstances under which detention may be sought to the most
serious of crimes,”24 and approved mental health detention for
persons with a mental disorder who are a found to be a threat of
“injury to the public” or to her “own survival or safety.”25 Sex
offender detention falls into this category. Enemy combatants and
insurrectionists are deemed an inherent and serious physical threat
to Americans and an existential threat to the United States.26
The Supreme Court also requires relatively strict due process
rights before the government can override the right to liberty. The
general test for adequate due process requires a balancing of the
following factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.27

For each type of detention, the detainees’ interests differ
significantly depending on the duration of detention or if they are
likely to suffer from a stigma if detained. The government’s
interests differ based on the number of people threatened by a
dangerous person, whether it can provide a benefit to the detainee,
and whether the United States as an entity is threatened and other
consequences of war. Another point of differentiation is that
pretrial and mental health detention are carried out as ordinary
functions of the government, while enemy combatant detention
22

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 691 (2001).
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739. The Bail Reform Act currently allows pretrial for those
who committed violent crimes that could lead to at least 10 years imprisonment, any crime
that could be punished with lifetime imprisonment or the death penalty; drug crimes that
lead to at least 10 years imprisonment, convictions for two more felonies or a felony that
involves a minor victim or use of a weapon. 18 U.S.C. §3142 (f)(1) (2018).
24 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
25 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1975).
26 HALLIE LUDSIN, PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 305-06
(2016).
27 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
23
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forms part of the extraordinary powers of the government during a
war or insurrection. The relevance of these points will become
clearer throughout the discussion.
With a few exceptions, the Supreme Court has not established
minimum due process standards for detaining someone considered
to be dangerous. Rather, it has approved or disapproved various
statutes based on the strength of their rights protections and their
efforts to reduce the risk that a person will be erroneously detained.
In U.S. v Salerno, the Court approved the due process requirements
for pretrial detention under the federal Bail Reform Act because (1)
the government must first show probable cause that a crime was
committed; (2) it “must convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear
and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can
reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person;” and
(3) detention is permitted only for a short period under the Speedy
Trial Act.28 In addition to the right to a hearing, the statute
guarantees a right to counsel including free counsel for anyone who
cannot afford it; a right to cross examine witnesses; and a right to
written reasons for the court’s decision.29
For purposes of later comparison, the approved Bail Reform Act
places the burden of proof on the government, establishes an
objective, clear and convincing standard of proof, and requires
proof that detention is necessary. The Supreme Court approved the
burden and standard of proof as a reflection of an appropriate
balance between the individual’s “strong interest” in liberty and the
government’s “compelling” interest in preventing the “most serious
of crimes.”30
The Court’s Salerno decision suggests that lesser due process
standards may fulfill the government’s constitutional obligations
but its later decisions treat the Bail Reform Act as setting the bar.31
In Foucha v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court overturned a mental
health detention statute because “[u]nlike the sharply focused
scheme at issue in Salerno, the Louisiana scheme of confinement

28 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750. For pretrial detention, the Court has established that
individuals confronting pretrial detention and who are indigent are entitled to a free
attorney. The basis for this rests in the 6th Amendment, which applies to criminal cases
only.
29 See Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(b).
30 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746-50.
31 See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82-83 (1992).
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[was] not carefully limited.”32 The Court rejected the statute in
Foucha in large part because it placed the burden on the potential
detainee to prove he was not dangerous, which the Court declared
allowed the state to “prove nothing to justify . . . detention.”33
Along with shifting the burden of proof to the state, in Addington v.
Texas, the Court further held that the 14th Amendment’s due process
clause requires a standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence
that the person is dangerous and detention is necessary for mental
health detainees.34 It explained that the choice of who carries the
burden of proof reflects who should carry the risk of a wrongful
decision.35 Stated differently, due process requires the party with
the least at stake to carry the burden of proof. The strictness of the
standard of proof reflects the seriousness of the consequences of an
erroneous decision on the person with the most at stake.36 The more
serious the consequences, the more difficult the standard of proof.
At stake in mental health detention is the individual’s liberty
interest, her interest in avoiding the stigma of mental health
detention, and the state’s interest in protecting public safety and
caring for the ill.37 In Addington, the Court determined that the
individual facing a loss of liberty had the most at stake.38 It then
rejected a preponderance of the evidence standard for mental health
detention because of the gravity of harm that a wrongful loss of
liberty could cause. Rather, it concluded that the lesser standard of
proof is appropriate where the risk is a “mere loss of money.”39
Balancing the state’s interests against a detainee’s liberty rights, the
Court rejected a beyond the reasonable doubt standard because of
how difficult it is to prove future dangerousness.40
The scales pictured below capture how the Supreme Court
weighs the individual’s interests compared to the state’s interests
when the government seeks to detain someone as dangerous in nonwartime. Under Addington, the party whose interests weigh less
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 81.
Id. at 81-82.
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 425, 432 (1979).
See id. at 423-24.
See id.
See id. at 426.
Id. at 427.
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 424 (1979)..
See id. at 422.
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carries the burden of proof, and with it, a greater risk of error or a
wrongful outcome. The more heavily the scale is weighed down,
the stricter the standard of proof required to justify detention.41

41 Steve Wexler, Burden of Proof, Writ Large, 33 U.B.C. L. REV. 75, 78 (1999) (“The
heavier a burden, the harder it is to meet; the more likely a certain result, the steeper the
slant of the law. If the law makes a burden of proof heavy enough, no one will try to bear
it. This is why we have such a high standard of proof in criminal cases.”)
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Figure A: Pretrial Detention: Most Serious Crimes

Public
Safety

Liberty

Individual’s Interest

State’s Interest

Individual’s interests: liberty
State’s interests: public safety
Burden of proof: government
Standard of proof: clear and convincing evidence

Figure B: Mental Health Detention
Public

Care

Public
Safety

Stigma
Liberty

Individual’s Interest

State’s Interest

Individual’s interests: liberty; freedom from stigma
State’s interests: public safety and caring for the ill
Burden of proof: government
Standard of proof: clear and convincing evidence
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The Constitution’s due process and liberty protections do not
allow for mandatory detention, or detention without an
individualized hearing, in either mental health or pretrial detention.
But, the Bail Reform Act does allow for a rebuttable presumption
of dangerousness for (1) people accused of certain, particularly
egregious, violent crimes, capital offenses and drug felonies that
could lead to 10 or more years in prison; or (2) if a person had been
convicted of a violent crime subject to at least 10 years
imprisonment within the past 5 years and committed this offense
while released on bail.42 The potential harm if the released accused
person commits a similarly egregious crime justifies the
presumption. Notably, the burden of proof remains with the
government, but if one of those criteria is met, the accused must
provide at least some evidence to rebut the presumption of
dangerousness in a pretrial hearing.43 The effect of the rebuttable
presumption is to weigh the government’s interest in public safety
more heavily, as pictured in Figure 3.

42 See § 3142(e)(3). Federal courts have upheld the constitutionality of the rebuttable
presumption. See e.g., United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, (1983); United States v.
Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 111-18 (1986); United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489, 493-500
(1985).
43 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).
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Figure 3: Pretrial Detention – Egregious Crimes

Public
Safety
Liberty

Individual’s Interest

State’s Interest

Individual’s interests: liberty
State’s interests: public safety at its greatest
Burden of proof: government
Standard of proof: clear and convincing evidence with rebuttable
presumption of dangerousness

The Supreme Court decisions on due process standards for flight
risk are less robust. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the burden
or standard of proof that a person is a flight risk, but federal court
decisions have required the government to prove that conditions of
release, like bail, are necessary by the preponderance of the
evidence.44 Substantively, the Court uses the Constitution’s 8th
Amendment excessive bail clause to determine the constitutionality
of conditions of release.45 It employs another balancing test to
measure the “government’s proposed conditions of release or
detention” against “the perceived evil” the conditions are meant to

44 See United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 5 (1987); see also CHARLES DOYLE,
CONG. RES. SERV., R40221, BAIL: AN OVERVIEW OF FED. CRIM. L.10 (2017). The U.S.
Department of Justice’s Criminal Resource Manual that was archived and not replaced by
the Trump Administration, listed preponderance of the evidence as the correct standard of
proof for determining flight risk for pretrial detention. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL §26 (last updated, Jan. 2020).
45 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987).
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prevent.46 To avoid a finding of excessive bail, “when the
Government has admitted that its only interest is in preventing
flight, bail must be set by a court at a sum designed to ensure that
goal, and no more.”47 The amount of bond or other conditions, then,
must be only as much as necessary to constitute “adequate assurance
that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.”48.
The assessment must be individualized and focused on “assuring the
presence of that individual defendant.”49 In Stack v. Boyle, the
Court described the traditional standards for assessing bail amounts
as those listed in the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 46(c),
which required courts to consider “the nature and circumstances of
the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against him, the
financial ability of the defendant to give bail and the character of
the defendant.”50 It described any attempt to set the amount based
solely on the alleged crime as “an arbitrary act” and finds suspicious
“bail in an amount greater than that usually fixed for serious charges
of crimes.”51
To put the Supreme Court’s assessment in this context onto the
same scale used for other forms of detention, the state’s primary
interest is in ensuring the accused appears for trial, although it may
account for other interests in the determination of bail amounts. The
individual’s interest is in liberty. The burden of proof is on the state,
because its interests weigh less heavily than the accused’s and
therefore should bear the greater risk of a wrongful decision.
Following current federal practice, the standard of proof is
preponderance of the evidence, equivalent to the risk of a mere loss
of money, which often is what is at stake for criminally accused who
are not considered “specially dangerous.” The scale is pictured in
Figure 4.

46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 754.
Id.
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
Id. at 1, 5.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 6.
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Figure 4: Pretrial Detention: Flight Risk

Other
factors
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Liberty

Individual’s Interest

State’s Interest

Individual’s interests: liberty
State’s interests: ensuring appearance in court, other factors
Burden of proof: government
Standard of proof: preponderance of the evidence

Liberty rights and the presumption of liberty are more
circumscribed for detention during a war or insurrection. The
Supreme Court treats threats from a war or insurrection as
exceptional circumstances because of the broad danger they pose to
the country and its population as well as the difficulty the ordinary
legal system has in responding to an uncommon threat.52 It
describes the interest in protecting society as “at its peak,”53
especially in its goal of preventing enemies from “return[ing] to
battle against the United States.”54 With foreign combatants in
times of a declared war, the Supreme Court allows the federal
government to simply assume that “[t]he alien enemy is bound by
an allegiance which commits him to lose no opportunity to forward
the cause of our enemy.”55
52 See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 165 (1948); see also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507, 518-19
(2004).
53 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).
54 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531.
55 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 772 (1950).
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The Supreme Court’s most recent decisions on detention of
enemy combatants have come in response to the government’s
detention scheme under the post-9/11 Authorization of the Use of
Military Force (AUMF).56 The AUMF grants the Executive the
power to use “necessary and appropriate force” against those who
attack the U.S.57 The federal government sought to use its war
powers to detain suspected terrorists as enemy combatants and to
prohibit petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus for release, which
would mean no judicial oversight of the detention decision. The
Supreme Court repeatedly acknowledged that wartime detention “is
so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise
of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress [] authorized the
President to use” in the AUMF; yet it refused to find that power
unlimited.58 Each decision fretted the founders’ fear that unchecked
executive detention would lead to tyranny.59
In Hamdi v. Rumsfield, the government sought to detain Hamdi,
a United States citizen taken in Afghanistan and initially held in
Guantanamo Bay, without judicial oversight.60 By the time of the
decision, the government had transferred Hamdi to a detention
facility in the United States.61 The government argued that Hamdi
was not entitled to petition for habeas corpus or to due process
checks because it carried out Hamdi’s detention as part of its
wartime powers in emergency circumstances.62 While the Court
relied heavily on the fact that Hamdi is a U.S. citizen in justifying
its decision, the Court later employed its holdings in Hamdi to
noncitizen detainees, which makes Hamdi highly relevant to
56 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, S.J. Res. 23, 107th
Cong. (2001).
57 Id.
58 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518, 526; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733
(2008).
59 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 744 (2008) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) “[T]he practice
of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable
instruments of tyranny.”)); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530-531 (quoting Ex Parte Milligan, 71
U.S. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1866) “[The Founders] knew--the history of the world told them--the
nation they were founding, be its existence short or long, would be involved in war; how
often or how long continued, human foresight could not tell; and that unlimited power,
wherever lodged at such a time, was especially hazardous to freemen”)).
60 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 527.
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understanding the limits of the government’s wartime detention
powers.
Relying on the traditional balancing test, the Court balanced the
interests of the detainee against the interests of the government, and
ultimately rejected the government’s argument.63 The Court
described Hamdi’s interests as “the most elemental of liberty
interests–the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s
own government.”64 It found that the government had weighty
interests in protecting its citizens from war and “treasonous
behavior,” including by preventing enemy combatants from
returning to the fight.65 It further recognized the government’s
interests in “reducing the process” in recognition of “the practical
difficulties” of searching for evidence and holding hearings during
a war.66 The Court ultimately found that while weighty, these
interests were not enough to wholly override the “values that this
country holds dear or the privilege that is American citizenship. It
is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our
Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it
is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to
the principles for which we fight abroad.”67 The Court held that the
government is required to provide citizen-detainees with the factual
basis for the declaration of enemy combatant status, and a fair
hearing to challenge their status “before a neutral decisionmaker.”68
This requirement of a constitutionally adequate process does not
mean that the government cannot limit due process given the
context. The Court in Hamdi concluded: “At the same time, the
exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside from these
core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to
alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time
of ongoing military conflict.”69 In dicta, the Court contemplated the
possibility of relying on hearsay evidence or a presumption in favor
of the government’s evidence to alleviate the burden.70 Even with
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

See id. at 527.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 530.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-32.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 533.
See id. at 533-34.
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that said, the language in the dicta requires that the government must
first provide evidence that the person is an enemy combatant before
shifting the burden to the detainee to rebut the presumption.71
For the purposes of this article, the most interesting aspect of
this decision is that the Supreme Court rejected that constitutional
war powers and foreign affairs powers justify extraordinary
deference to the federal government. However, as Part II below
shows, these powers traditionally support that exact justification for
immigration detention. The Supreme Court specifically spurned the
government’s argument that separation of powers and the
Constitution’s grant of war powers to Congress and the Executive
demand that the courts “circumscribe” their oversight.72 It stated:
We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s
citizens. Whatever power the United States Constitution
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or
with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties
are at stake.73

It further relied on International Humanitarian Law, a subset of
international law, to bolster checks on the President’s wartime and
foreign affairs powers.74
While the Hamdi decision emphasized the detainee’s American
citizenship in its reasoning, the Supreme Court in Boumediene v.
Bush refused to dispense with habeas petitions and due process
requirements for noncitizens facing enemy combatant detention.75
It did not find compelling the government’s argument that
Boumediene’s noncitizen, enemy combatant status and the fact that
he was captured and detained on foreign territory barred him from
constitutional protection.76 To the contrary, the Court found that the
Constitution protects noncitizens and citizens alike.77 It then
dispensed with the argument that separation of powers during war
revokes judicial oversight of enemy combatant detention by looking
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

See id. at 534.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535-36.
Id.
Id. at 521.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
See id. at 739, 742-743.
See id. at 742-43.
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back at the Framer’s intent to guarantee the Writ of Habeas Corpus
as an essential component of a constitutionally limited
government.78
Part and parcel of the Court’s decision is the importance of the
right to liberty.79 It found that national security depends as much on
guaranteeing liberty as it does on military might:
[S]ecurity depends upon a sophisticated intelligence apparatus
and the ability of our Armed Forces to act and to interdict. There
are further considerations, however. Security subsists, too, in
fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief among these are
freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal
liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers.80

The Court rebuffed the extraterritoriality argument on the basis
that Boumediene was being detained at Guantanamo Bay, which
was under the de facto sovereignty of the United States.81 In doing
so, the Supreme Court extended the reach of the Constitution to all
places where the government has effective sovereignty.82
The Supreme Court again refused to employ extraordinary
deference to the government because the circumstances implicated
the political branches’ wartime and foreign affairs powers.83 Rather,
the Court noted that executive-ordered detention inherently makes
the need for access to habeas corpus review “more urgent.”84 It
looked to balance the need to protect detainees from arbitrary
detention and the practicalities of detention proceedings during a
war, relying on U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright, for the proposition that the
judiciary must give “proper deference . . . to the political branches”
that are seeking to combat terrorism, but that this deference did not
require it to abstain from real judicial oversight.85 The Court
concluded: “The laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and
remain in force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be

78

See id. at 743-44.
See id.
80 Id. at 797.
81 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770-71.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 778.
84 Id. at 785.
85 Id. at 797 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936)). As described in Part II, the Supreme Court relies on U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright to
effectively strip immigration detention of judicial oversight.
79
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reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the
framework of the law.”86
Having established Boumediene’s entitlement to liberty and due
process rights, the Court identified a variety of failings in the
government’s detention review process, including the lack of access
to a lawyer, the presumption favoring the government’s evidence,
the “[in]ability to rebut the Government’s evidence” and the
inability to present new evidence after an initial detention hearing.87
The Court concluded that the process the government chose for
enemy combatant detention review created a “considerable risk of
error” of a wrongful loss of liberty and, as such, ruled the detention
scheme as constitutionally inadequate.88 It did not consider whether
using preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof is
appropriate.89 The lower courts hearing challenges to enemy
combatant detention continue to follow the burden and standard of
proof required in Hamdi, along with the rebuttable presumption of
dangerousness.90
For comparative purposes, the Supreme Court requires the
government to retain the burden to prove that the detainee is an
enemy combatant.91 However, once the government shows the
person fits the category of enemy combatant, the burden of evidence
shifts to the detainee to provide some evidence rebutting a
presumption of dangerousness.92 The burden of persuasion of the
necessity of detention–at all times–remains on the government.93
Figure 4 reflects the balance between the individual’s interest and
the government’s interests in enemy combatant detention.

86

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
Id. at 767, 789-90.
88 Id. at 778, 785.
89 See id. at 778, 785.
90 See BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION 2.0: THE
GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 12 (The Brookings Inst., 2012); see also
The Legal Rights of Guantanamo Detainees: What are they, Should they be Changed, and
is an End in Sight?: Hearing before the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 9
(2007) (statement of Steven Engel, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
91 See WITTES ET AL., supra note 90, at 12.
92 See id.
93 See id. at 14.
87
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Figure 4: Enemy Combatant Detention
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Individual’s interests: liberty
State’s interests: national security “at its peak”; burden of
gathering evidence during war
Burden of proof: government
Standard of proof: preponderance of the evidence; rebuttable
presumption if an enemy combatant

As this review shows, pretrial, mental health and enemy
combatant detainees are entitled to a presumption of liberty
intended to make it difficult for the government to erroneously strip
individuals of their liberty. Even noncitizen enemy combatants
waging war against the United States are entitled to constitutional
liberty and due process protections that place the burden on the
government to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the
individual is dangerous. That is not to say that the protections are
ideal, but that the Court places meaningful constitutional limits on
this type of detention despite the strength of the government’s
interest in protecting society and the United States as an entity. It
also rejects government efforts to claim extraordinary deference to
its use of foreign affairs and national security/war powers.
B. Detention under the Immigration and Nationality Act
Although noncitizens gain a right to liberty under the
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Constitution when they enter the United States, that right is severely
limited for immigration detention when compared to all other forms
of detention.94 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to detain immigrants
pending a determination of whether they should be removed from
the United States and for those ordered to be removed.95 The INA
requires mandatory detention for certain categories of immigrants
deemed to be particularly dangerous or a grave flight risk and grants
discretion to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to detain
all other immigrants on those same grounds.96 Under INA
§1226(c)(1), the government must detain any noncitizens who are
found to be inadmissible–meaning they cannot be granted
permission to enter the United States–because of convictions for
crimes of moral turpitude, drug offenses, or for involvement in
terrorist activities.97 Also subject to mandatory detention is anyone
who is deportable because she committed a crime of moral turpitude
that led to at least 1 year of imprisonment, multiple crimes of moral
turpitude, aggravated felonies, drug crimes, firearm offenses,
espionage, or was involved in terrorist activities.98
These
noncitizens are categorized, as a group, as a threat to society and are
simply presumed to be a danger. They cannot rebut this
presumption. Additionally, INA §1231(a)(2) requires mandatory
detention for anyone who has already been ordered removed from
the United States on the assumption that this category of noncitizens
poses a serious flight risk.99
Importantly, mandatory detention dispenses with the need for an
individualized hearing before the government strips noncitizens of
their liberty rights. It means there is no judicial or administrative
oversight of the detention decision. In Demore v. Kim, The
Supreme Court upheld mandatory detention as a reasonable
response to evidence that some noncitizens convicted of crimes
pose a risk of recidivism and that the government was having

94

See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
See HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RES. SERV., R45915, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: A
LEGAL OVERVIEW 9-10 (2019).
96 See id. at 9.
97 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §1226(c)(1); see also 8 U.S.C.A.
§1227(a)(1).
98 See 8 U.S.C.A. §1227.
99 See 8 U.S.C.A. §1231(a)(2).
95
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difficulty locating noncitizens subject to removal.100 Despite
making reference to the 5th Amendment, the Court only asked
whether mandatory detention is a reasonable response to these
concerns.101
Because mandatory detention falls under the
government’s immigration powers, it concluded that the “Due
Process Clause does not require [the government] to employ the
least burdensome means” to ensure that noncitizens appear for their
hearings.102 It also rejected any requirement that the government
prove detention is “necessary” to ensure the noncitizen shows up for
immigration proceedings or to protect the community.103 Rather, it
weighted heavily the risk of recidivism and the cost to the United
States of having to locate removable immigrants.104 The Court
never even discussed the noncitizens’ liberty interest.
Figure 5 shows the balance of interests the Supreme Court uses
for detention of noncitizens Congress deemed most dangerous and
Figure 6 shows the balance for those considered at greatest risk for
flight. Consistent with the Court’s decision to give no weight to the
noncitizen detainee’s liberty interest, the figures do not show
detainees as having any liberty interest.

100
101
102
103
104

See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518-19 (2003).
See id. at 528.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 518-19.
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Figure 5: Immigration Detention: most dangerous
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Figure 6: Immigration Detention: ordered removed
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Under INA §1226(a), for all other noncitizens facing removal
proceedings, DHS has the discretion to order detention.105
Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers first order
detention, at which point noncitizens may request a custody hearing
before an immigration court to determine whether they may be
released from detention and, if so, under what conditions.106 Under
the immigration regulations, the grounds for detaining a noncitizen
are whether the person poses a flight risk or is a danger to the
community, including because she is a national security threat.107
These noncitizens are entitled a right to a lawyer at their own cost,
a right to an interpreter during the proceedings, a right to present
evidence and to cross examine witnesses, along with a right to
appeal.108
Under the INA regulations, detainees shoulder the burden of
proof. They must “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that
such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and
that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.”109 Based
on Supreme Court jurisprudence, that means the government is
considered to have more at stake if a dangerous person is released
or a noncitizen fails to appear at a court hearing than the noncitizen
who could lose her liberty. There is no set standard of proof. The
Board of Immigration Appeals, which hears appeals from the
immigration courts, has established nine factors Immigration
Judges should consider when assessing flight risk and
dangerousness and when setting any bond or other conditions for
release. They are:
(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States; (2)
the alien’s length of residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s

105 See 8 U.S.C.A. §1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien
may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision,
the Attorney General— (1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and (2) may release
the alien on— (A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or (B) conditional parole . . . “).
106 See 8 U.S.C.A. §1226(c)(2).
107 See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1 (2022); see also KEVIN R. JOHNSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
IMMIGRATION LAW 422 (2d ed. 2015).
108 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); see also Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §1229(b)(4); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 309 (1993); see also
JOHNSON, supra note 107, at 423.
109 See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8).
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family ties in the United States, and whether they may entitle the
alien to reside permanently in the United States in the future; (4)
the alien’s employment history; (5) the alien’s record of
appearance in court; (6) the alien’s criminal record, including the
extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency of such activity,
and the seriousness of the offenses; (7) the alien’s history of
immigration violations; (8) any attempts by the alien to flee
prosecution or otherwise escape from authorities; and (9) the
alien’s manner of entry to the United States.110

How much weight the immigration judge gives those factors is
also left to the immigration judge “as long as the decision is
reasonable.”111
The lack of a standard of proof and the near wholesale discretion
of the immigration judge means that an immigration judge could
require anywhere from as little as a modicum of support to
overwhelming evidence that the noncitizen is either a flight risk or
dangerous. Drawing a scale of the individual and government
interests is more complicated here, as it needs to reflect a range of
possibilities. Where the immigration judge requires only a
modicum of evidence, the standard is best reflected as equivalent to
preponderance of the evidence.112 Where the immigration judge’s
standard is overwhelming evidence, the standard would then
correlate with beyond a reasonable doubt.113 Figure 7, therefore,
reflects that range. Placing the individual and government interests
on the scale heavily weighted toward the government captures the
freedom immigration judges have to weigh the government’s
interests at its heaviest.

110 In the Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (citing In the Matter of
Saelee, 22 I&N Dec. 1258 (B.I.A. 2000); In the Matter of Drysdale, 20 I&N Dec. 815, 817
(B.I.A. 1994); In the Matter of Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 488 (B.I.A. 1987)).
111 Guerra, 24 I&N at 40.
112 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
113 See id.
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Figure 7: Discretionary Immig. Detention
Flight/Danger
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There have been a handful of habeas corpus cases in federal
district courts that have successfully challenged the burden and
standard of proof established by the federal regulations as a
violation of constitutional due process standards.114 These decisions
conclude that the Due Process Clause requires the government to
prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence and flight
risk by preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing
evidence.115 Several also add a requirement of proof that detention
is necessary for anyone without a criminal record.116 So far, the
Supreme Court has avoided reconsidering challenges to
immigration detention burden and standard of proof as violations of

114 See, e.g., Darko v. Sessions, 342 F. Supp. 3d 429, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (listing
other District Court decisions from other jurisdictions); Brito v. Barr, 415 F. Supp. 3d 258
(D. Mass. 2019); Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692-93 (D. Mass. 2018).
115 See Darko, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 435.
116 See Pensamiento, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 692-93.
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due process.117 This is despite noting that “[t]he Constitution
demands greater procedural protection even for property” than what
it requires when depriving an immigrant of liberty.118 The Supreme
Court has also failed to tackle the issue of how to set bond amounts
in the context of immigration detention.119
C. Distinctions between Noncitizens Detained under
Immigration Law and All Other Nonpunitive Detainees
This section explicates the stark differences between
immigration detention and all other forms of detention in the United
States by directly comparing the standards and burdens of proof,
along with the calculations behind them, described fully in Part I(A)
and Part I(B). This comparison is intended to highlight the
importance of meaningful judicial oversight of detention and the
gross unfairness of Congressional plenary power over immigration.
As these preceding sections highlighted, outside the emergency
circumstances of war, the Constitution requires the government to
meet rigorous due process standards to override liberty. The
government must prove by clear and convincing evidence in an
individual hearing that a potential mental health detainee or pretrial
detainee is a danger to the community.120 It places the risk of a
wrongful decision on the government because the stakes for the
person subject to detention are greater than for the government.121
And, it treats the gravity of those stakes as greater than a “mere loss
of money.”122 In contrast, under immigration law and regulations,
the federal government is permitted to order mandatory detention
for certain categories of noncitizens, which means no hearing at all.
They place the burden of proof on detainees to subjectively satisfy
immigration courts that they are not dangerous. The detainee alone
carries the risk that the government makes a wrongful decision
using a standard of proof that treats the loss of liberty as less weighty

117 See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830 (2018) (demonstrating an
instance where the Supreme Court has avoided reconsidering such a challenge).
118 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001).
119 The Massachusetts District Court, in contrast, applies the constitutional
requirement that bond or conditions of release be no greater than necessary to ensure a
person’s appearance in courts. See Brito v. Barr, 415 F. Supp. 3d 258, 267 (D. Mass. 2019).
120 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979).
121 See id.
122 Id. at 425.
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than “mere loss of money.” In fact, as the Supreme Court has
acknowledged, standards like those under the immigration
regulations require the government “prove nothing to justify . . .
detention.”123 Even in the context of war, when the government’s
interests are the greatest, the Constitution requires the government
to carry the burden of proof of the necessity of detention, albeit
subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government’s
evidence. Even then, every detainee is entitled to an individual
hearing and an opportunity to rebut the government’s evidence.
The preceding sections of Part I also show the same disparity of
treatment for detainees held as a flight risk. Only immigrant
detainees can be subjected to mandatory detention and even those
who may be released are required to carry the burden of proof and
meet a subjective, and therefore arbitrary, standard of proof set by
each individual judge. In contrast, pretrial detainees are held only
if the government can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
no conditions of release could ensure the detainee’s appearance or
the detainee is unable to meet the conditions placed on her release.
The starkness of the differential treatment is most apparent in a
side-by-side comparison of the balancing the due process
requirements for the different types of detention. Starting with
detention for dangerousness, there are two threats that reflect the
highest government interest in security–detention of persons
accused of the most egregious crimes and enemy combatant
detention. For pretrial detention and enemy combatant detention,
the seriousness of the risk of harm from wrongfully releasing the
most dangerous criminally accused or an enemy combatant warrants
a rebuttable presumption of dangerousness, although at all times the
government retains the burden of proof. For pretrial detention, the
standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence; because the
threat from an enemy combatant is not just to a potentially large
number of people but also to the country itself, and because of the
exigencies of war, the standard is preponderance of the evidence.
Mandatory immigration detention captures the highest level of
threats, but also covers crimes that by comparison are serious, but
not to the same level of egregiousness as threatened by those
detained as enemy combatants or those considered “specially
dangerous” for pretrial detention. For example, noncitizens who
threaten a crime of moral turpitude punishable with 1 year
123

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82-83 (1992).
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imprisonment are subject to mandatory detention, while pretrial
detention is mostly limited to those whose crimes could be punished
with at least with 10 years of imprisonment.124 There is simply
anon-rebuttable presumption of immigration detention for
noncitizens convicted of serious crimes. To put a fine point on it, a
noncitizen accused of passing a fraudulent check that could subject
her to a year’s imprisonment cannot be held in pretrial detention
because the harm if the crime is repeated is not sufficiently serious
to revoke her liberty rights. Yet, the same noncitizen, now
convicted of the crime and sentenced to 1 year in prison, is
considered so dangerous that there can be no justification for
releasing her from immigration detention. It would be easy to say
the difference is the conviction, but the detention decision is about
the possibility of future harm, not punishment for past harm, which
means that the possible harm is identical in both cases.
Below is a comparison of the weighted scale of individual and
government interests in each of these circumstances as set out in
Parts I(A) and (B). The weight of the public safety concern should
either be identical for all three forms of detention or the public
safety concern for mandatory immigration detention – which covers
lower-level crimes – should be less. Yet, the Supreme Court
effectively allows Congress and the Executive to weigh the public
safety concern for immigration detention as so heavy as to wholly
negate any individual’s liberty interest. Even national security
concerns–where the safety of large numbers of people and the
country as an entity are under threat–is not enough to effectively
eradicate the individual’s liberty interest.

124 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1) (2018). Importantly, what the government treats as the
most egregious crimes is not identical to those that result in mandatory detention for
immigrants. Pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act currently is limited to those who
committed violent crimes that could lead to at least 10 years imprisonment, any crime that
could be punished with lifetime imprisonment or the death penalty, drug crimes that lead
to at least 10 years imprisonment, convictions for two more felonies, or a felony that
involves a minor victim or use of a weapon. A fine grain analysis likely will show even
greater discrimination against immigrants facing detention; however, it is not necessary
for purposes of this article.
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Pretrial Detention: Most Egregious
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While noncitizens regain their liberty interest when the danger
they pose is not to the level of a crime of moral turpitude subject to
1 year of imprisonment, the contrast again with pretrial detention
for the most serious, but not most egregious, crimes and with mental
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health detention remains just as stark. As shown below, an
individual’s liberty interest substantially outweighs the
government’s public safety interest for the most serious crimes or
its combined interest in public safety and the need to care for a
person suffering a mental health disorder. Yet, once a person’s
status as a noncitizen possibly subject to removal is introduced, the
government’s interest in public safety against lesser crimes
skyrockets and the weight of the individual’s interest in liberty
plummets.
Mental Health Detention

Public
Safety
Care
Stigma
Liberty

Pretrial Detention: Most Serious Crimes

Public
Safety

Liberty
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Immigration Detention: Lesser Crimes

Liberty

Public
Safety

The difference in the scales where the government’s goal is to
ensure appearance in court or other government proceedings
evidences the same discrimination against noncitizens. Pretrial
detention for anyone deemed a flight risk is comparable in terms of
goals with discretionary immigration detention for flight risk since
both focus on ensuring a person’s appearance in court hearings.
Mandatory detention for anyone already ordered removed reflects
flight concerns, but its goal is to ensure a person is available for
removal. Despite that, it is important to compare all three forms of
detention next to each other because it again highlights that the only
context in which the government’s interests, whatever they are,
outweighs an individual’s liberty interest is immigration detention.
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The differential treatment in the burden and standards of proof
for immigration detention and all other forms of detention
discriminates against noncitizens, creates unequal protection of the
law based on an immigrant’s status as a noncitizen in removal
proceedings and leads to serious violations of the noncitizen
immigrants’ rights to liberty and due process. So far, the Supreme
Court has refused to address those violations, offering instead that
“since Mathews, this Court has firmly and repeatedly endorsed the
proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”125 The next Part explains why
and, in doing so, seeks to identify a new, cogent foundation for
challenging Congressional plenary power over immigration that
would replace so far unsuccessful constitutional rights arguments.
II. Immigration Regulation as a Sovereign Power
The most obvious question that results from the comparisons of
the different types of detention is how does the federal government
have the power to so blatantly discriminate against immigrant
detainees? The surface answer is Congressional plenary power, but
that begs another question. The real question is where does
Congressional plenary power come from? How does the Supreme
Court justify finding that Congress, and by delegation the
Executive, have the power to violate what most of us believe are
sacred constitutional protections for the rights to liberty and
equality? The Court does not rely on the Constitution to justify
these rights violations, but instead located an extraconstitutional
source for those violations. It then shielded the violations from
meaningful judicial review by treating immigration law as a matter
of foreign affairs and national security and therefore subject to
extraordinary judicial deference.
Together, Parts II and III explain how the Supreme Court
birthed Congressional plenary power over immigration. Part II
starts the story with by explaining the Court’s search a source for
federal immigration powers it believed the Constitution did not
explicitly provide. Its search identified sovereignty rights under
international law, or what it terms inherent sovereignty, as a new
source of immigration powers, with some bolstering from what the
court terms foreign affairs and national security powers that at least
partially derive from the Constitution. Part III picks up the tale
125

Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003).
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where the Court combined this extraconstitutional source with the
political question doctrine, which allowed it to unmoor those
powers from the Constitution and maintain them as relatively
absolute long after international law rejected sovereignty rights as
absolute and the Supreme Court ruled that the government’s
exercise of foreign affairs and national security powers did not turn
otherwise legal questions into political concerns. The decision to
locate a new source of federal powers shreds the notion that most of
us learn in grade school –United States government is one of
Constitutionally enumerated powers and can act only within the
bounds of the power the Constitution delegates to it. If the
Constitution remained the source of immigration power, the 5th and
14th Amendments would restrict how the federal and state
governments utilize those powers. Instead, Congress has plenary
powers.
Tracking the chronology of plenary power cases set out by legal
historian Matthew Lindsay, this Part examines the evolution of
immigration powers from state powers to federal powers, creating
the conditions for the Court’s rejection of meaningful judicial
oversight, whether constitutional or under international law, of
immigration law and policy.126 This historical distillation is
essential to understanding why, so far, constitutional arguments
challenging immigration law do little more than dent Congressional
plenary power; why the Supreme Court jurisprudence on
immigration law and policy is anemic at best and mostly incoherent,
as explored in Part IV; and, therefore, why international law
provides a much sounder foundation for challenging nearly absolute
immigration power.
First, Section A explains the conception of sovereignty that
ultimately underpins federal immigration powers. Section B then
describes the Court’s initial decision to employ the Constitution’s
10th Amendment and grant states control over immigration, limited
only where that power bumped up against federal powers under the
Constitution’s Commerce Clause. Section C next describes how
Supreme Court jurisprudence slowly transformed immigration
control into a solely federal power, initially by claiming

126 See generally Matthew Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security,
and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.C.L.L. REV. 1 (2010).
Much of this exploration, particularly the chronology and the choice of cases, derives from
Lindsay’s history of Congressional plenary Power over immigration in the United States.
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immigration or the movement of people as a form of commerce
under the Commerce Clause and later immigration law as part and
parcel of federal naturalization, foreign affairs and war powers
under the Constitution. Section C concludes by explaining how the
Court upended the assumption of enumerated powers to embed
international law as a direct source of federal immigration power,
bolstered by foreign affairs and national security powers, to allow
the federal government to claim plenary power over immigration.
A. Construction of Sovereignty
Even from the earliest decisions on immigration law the
Supreme Court understood control over which foreigners to allow
entry into the United States, and under what conditions, as part of
the sovereignty rights every independent country enjoys. The
earliest cases mostly focused on whether the federal or state
governments are entitled to those rights.127 Before jumping into
how the Court answered that question and how the answer led to the
creation of Congressional plenary power over immigration, it is
important to understand what sovereign rights and the relationship
between sovereignty rights and immigration are as well as
sovereignty rights and the Constitution. This understanding serves
as part of the answer to the ultimate question of how the Court
justifies allowing the government to violate immigrants’ rights in
ways that are not permitted outside of immigration proceedings or
against citizens.
The concept of sovereignty rights developed from the Treaty of
Westphalia ending the Thirty Years War that gripped Europe in the
17th Century.128 The goal of these rights was to establish clear
boundaries of authority between countries to ensure peace. The
United Nations Charter Article 2 has since codified these rights,
granting all states the following four rights:
The right to sovereign authority over state territory;
The right to sovereign equality;
The right to be free from foreign interference in domestic
affairs; and

127 See e.g. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 132 (1837); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283
(1849) (Passenger Cases); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1873).
128 See Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary
Sovereignty Waiver”—Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the
Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 374 (2005).
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The right to be free from threat or use of force against a
country’s political or territorial integrity.129

Sovereign powers over immigration are tied to the right to
authority over the state–the state and its citizens decide who may
visit or live there.130 Sovereign equality is implicated in that one
country cannot force another country to allow entry to foreign
citizens or impose any immigration law or policy or limits on them
without the consent of the affected country.
In its immigration jurisprudence, the Supreme Court conceives
of sovereignty as granting countries full authority–and therefore
power–over the state and the role of the Constitution as distributing
that power to the state or federal governments or both. In its 1837
decision in New York v. Miln, the Supreme Court established that
the power to control immigration “undeniably existed at the
formation of the Constitution” and derived from the sovereign’s
right under international law to “forbid the entrance of his territory
either to foreigners in general or in particular cases or to certain
persons or for certain particular purposes, according as he may think
it advantageous to the state.”131 This sovereign right “is an incident
of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence.”132 The
right to control immigration underpins the Supreme Court’s
decision to make immigration power federal while the right to
sovereign equality underpins the Court’s refusal to place any limits–
constitutional or otherwise–on Congress’ plenary power to control
immigration, as described in Parts II and III.
Having established that part and parcel of sovereignty is the
129 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 1, 4, 7; see also Hallie Ludsin, Returning Sovereignty
to the People, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 97, 102 (2013).
130 See U.N. Off. High Comm’r f Hum. Rts., Expulsions of Aliens in International
Human Rights Law, OHCHR Discussion Paper, 1 (2006) (describing “the sovereign
prerogative of states to regulate the presence of foreigners on their territory.”); see also
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with Commentaries, art. 3
(2014) (right to expel aliens).
131 New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 132 (1837) (quoting Vattel, Book 2, ch. 8, § 100);
see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (“For more than a century, this
Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a
‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments
largely immune from judicial control.’” (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792 (1977));
see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 588–89 (1952) (“[A]ny policy toward
aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the
conduct of foreign relations [and] the war power.”).
132 Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (Chinese Exclusion Case).
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power to control immigration, the Supreme Court fight that
ultimately concludes with the development of Congressional
plenary power is over which government entity is entitled to
exercise the sovereign power–the state governments, the federal
government or both. Under the structure of the Constitution, some
of that power could belong to the states.133 Initially, the fact that the
Constitution did not expressly delegate immigration powers to the
federal government led the Court to grant states shared control with
the federal government over immigration.134 How the Supreme
Court wrested all immigration powers from the states, described in
the remainder of this section, is essential to how it determined that
Congress is entitled to plenary powers. Stated differently, the
justifications for federal immigration powers also justify making
them absolute.
B. The States as the Sovereign
Having established sovereignty rights as the basis for
immigration powers, the next question is who is the sovereign
entitled to those rights? From the mid-nineteenth century, the
federal government sought to claim exclusive immigration powers
against coastal states seeking to regulate immigration to protect
public health, morals and finances. In Miln, in 1837, the federal
government challenged a New York regulation that required ship
captains to provide the state with the demographic information of
passengers upon arrival in its ports to regulate the number of
foreigners arriving, especially those likely to be indigent.135 The
federal government argued that it alone could control immigration
because immigrants were objects of commerce under the
Constitution’s Commerce Clause.136
The Court, however,
concluded that the title of sovereign passed directly from Britain to
the states at the end of the Revolutionary War and that it remained
there unless the Constitution delegated that power to the federal

133 See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 856 (1987).
134 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to
the people.”); see also Miln, 36 U.S. at 139 (The states’ powers over immigration end when
they bump up against federal powers, such as under the commerce clause.).
135 See Miln, 36 U.S. at 104.
136 See id. at 131.
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government.137
The Court rejected the characterization of
immigrants as objects of commerce and instead treated them as a
threat to public order and subject to the state’s police powers –
powers not delegated elsewhere.138 For the Court, New York’s
desire to control immigration was not just logical but a “duty of the
state.”139 In an enduring description of the danger of immigration,
the Court explained that New York uniquely suffered from the “evil
of thousands of foreign emigrants arriving there” who may need
public assistance.140 Accordingly, “states were, like nations,
endowed by international law with the absolute power to defend
their territorial integrity against foreign encroachment.”141
Importantly, the decision followed the doctrine of constitutionally
enumerated powers.
C. The Evolution of Federal Sovereignty over Immigration
The federal government spent the next eighty years fighting for
the title of sovereign solely entitled to immigration powers.142 The
erosion of the states as the sovereign began in 1849 with the
Passengers Case, when the Supreme Court treated the passage of
immigrants on a ship as an act of commerce, preempting state police
powers.143 New York sought to tax arriving passengers and crews
to cover the cost of caring for indigent immigrants.144 The Court
determined that “[i]f the transportation of passengers be a branch of
commerce, of which there can be no doubt, it follows that the act of
New York, in imposing this tax is a regulation of commerce.”145
Once the passengers arrive, however, they are no longer objects of
commerce but instead subject to state law.146 States could then
regulate immigrants upon arrival. The Court bolstered federal

137

See id. at 132.
See id. at 133.
139 Id. at 141.
140 New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 136 (1837).
141 Lindsay, supra note 126, at 16.
142 See Henkin, supra note 133, at 854-55.
143 Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 452 (1849) (determining that “all persons and
property on board, as a unit belonging to foreign commerce . . . was exempt from the state
taxing power”).
144 Id. at 403, 407.
145 Id. at 405.
146 Id.
138
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claims to immigration powers by linking commerce to international
relations. The Court equated this type of commerce with “foreign
intercourse” and declared: “All the powers which relate to our
foreign intercourse are confided to the general [federal]
government. Congress have the power to regulate commerce, to
define and punish piracies.”147 With this finding, the Court began
to develop another constitutional pillar on which to rest federal
immigration powers claims–foreign affairs powers–that will prove
fundamental to the extraordinary judicial deference the Court grants
federal immigration powers.
In 1875, the Supreme Court extended the period in which a
noncitizen would be considered an object of commerce to the point
of disembarkation.148 In its Henderson decision, the Court
concluded that the commercial transaction ended only after the
immigrant disembarked; as such it could not be completed if a state
placed a barrier to an immigrant leaving the ship.149 Once
disembarkation is complete, however, the states could regulate
immigration using its police powers “for the preservation of good
order, of the health and comfort of the citizens, and their protection
against pauperism and against contagious and infectious diseases
and other matters of legislation of like character.”150
As with the earlier Passenger Cases, the Court sought to
strengthen the federal government’s claim to immigration powers
by relying on constitutional foreign affairs powers. The Henderson
decision clarifies that federal power derives from the fact that
immigration regulation “belongs to that class of laws which concern
the exterior relation of this whole nation with other nations and
governments.”151
Immigration is “international” and the
Constitution grants the federal government authority over
international relations through its treaty making powers.152 If the
federal government can execute a treaty that regulates international
commerce, then Congress can pass laws on the subject.153 For the
Court, the need for uniform international relations further justified
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Id. at 393 (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 570 (1840)).
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 271 (1873).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 273.
Id. (referencing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2).
See id.
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federal power.154 The 1875 Chy Lung decision bolstered this
reasoning by pointing out that if a foreign government is dissatisfied
with international commerce or the regulation of its citizens, the
federal government would be held responsible, as opposed to any
individual state being held responsible.155 By the Chy Lung
decision, the federal government had sole control over immigration,
including after disembarkation, under the Commerce Clause and the
foreign affairs power.156 In its 1888 decision in the Head Money
Cases, the Court used the necessary and proper clause in Article 1
Section 8 of the Constitution to establish immigration powers as a
wholly implied federal power under the Commerce Clause.157
Despite having wrested control over immigration from the
States, the federal government was dissatisfied with its powers
under the Commerce Clause, even when bolstered by foreign affairs
powers. Treating people as objects of commerce was an
uncomfortable fit because their regulation was based on “the
perceived economic impact of immigration.”158 By the 1880s,
American leadership began to view immigrants as an “existential
threat to the Republic” that required more than commercial powers
to address.159 It began to fear not just the cost of immigrants as
public charges but “‘unfit’ nationalities and races that . . . pose a
fundamental challenge to the nation’s most cherished political and
economic values.”160 If federal power to control immigration
stopped when noncitizens were no longer objects of commerce, it
would have limited power to respond to these perceived challenges.
In response, the Supreme Court established sovereignty rights

154

See Henderson, 92 U.S. at 273.
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
156 See id. at 279-80; see also Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 593-94 (1884)
(reaffirming the Chy Lung decision). It has also been said that the federal government’s
success was a direct result of the civil war: “That the federal government had
unenumerated powers probably would not have been claimed, and surely would not have
been accepted, before Union victory in the Civil War vanquished states’ rights and
established federal supremacy by constitutional amendments imposed as the peace treaty
of the war.” Henkin, supra note 133, at 855.
157 See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595 (1880) (opining that when Congress
deems something necessary and proper, the Court is not permitted to inquire beyond it).
158 Matthew Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty and the Constitution of Foreignness,
45 CONN. L. REV. 743, 793 (2013); Henkin, supra note 133, at 856.
159 Lindsay, supra note 126, at 32.
160 Id. at 14.
155
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as the direct source of immigration powers, cementing full federal
control over immigration. The starting point is Chae Chan Ping,
also known as The Chinese Exclusion Case.161 In a xenophobiariven decision, the Supreme Court upheld federal power to exclude
Chinese immigrants from the United States in violation of an earlier
bilateral treaty with China that allowed relatively unfettered
migration of Chinese citizens to the United States.162 The Court
found that the government’s authority over immigration is part and
parcel of the exclusive sovereign authority that belongs to
“independent nations.”163 The Court explained that the Constitution
effectively delegated all powers related to foreign affairs to the
federal government as evidenced by its constitutionally enumerated
“powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel
invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican
governments to the states, and admit subjects of other nations to
citizenship.”164 The expectation, more fully developed in Chy Lung,
is that the United States speaks with one voice in the international
arena and not as “50 separate states.”165
The Chinese Exclusion Case also marked the turning point of
the Court’s view of noncitizens as a national security threat, rather
than as objects of commerce. The Court construed protecting the
nation against the “vast hordes of its [China’s] people crowding in
upon us” as “the highest duty” of the nation to which “nearly all
other considerations are to be subordinated.”166 More concretely,
the Court described the Chinese “race” as:
strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves and adhering
to the customs and usages of their own country. It seemed
impossible for them to assimilate with our people or to make any
change in their habits or modes of living. As they grew in numbers
each year, the people of the coast saw, or believed they saw, in
the facility of immigration and in the crowded millions of China,
where population presses upon the means of subsistence, great
danger that at no distant day that portion of our country would be

161

See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
See id. at 581, 603.
163 Id. at 604.
164 Id.
165 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (citing Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at
275-280).
166 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
162
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overrun by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict their
immigration.167

By constructing immigrants as a national security threat–or as
the opinion later says–a threat of “foreign aggression”–the Supreme
Court created a new justification for federal immigration powers.168
Importantly, the basis for national security powers seems to be
sovereignty rights as distributed by the Constitution to the federal
government through its war powers.169 The 1892 Nishimura Ekiu170
and 1893 Fong Yue Ting171 cases reinforced that federal
immigration powers were “inherent in sovereignty and essential to
self-preservation.”172
The 1936 case United States v. Curtiss-Wright173 reinforced
immigration powers as extraconstitutional, rather than “implied,
necessary or incidental to the expressed [constitutional] powers.”174
Curtiss-Wright had nothing to do with immigration powers, yet the
case is essential to finally and wholly establishing them as
emanating from international law. The Court heard a dispute over
whether the President had the power to sell arms to a South
American government despite a Congressional Joint Resolution
disallowing any such sales.175 The Court determined that national
law applies based on territory and, as such, the Constitution was
restricted in application to United States territory or internal
affairs.176 Extraterritorial matters, in contrast, fell under the purview
of international law.177 The Court explicitly declared that “[t]he
broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers
167

Id. at 595.
Lindsay, supra note 158, at 807 (quoting Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606).
169 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 (reiterating that “[t]he existence of war
would render the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing. The same
necessity, in a less pressing degree, may arise when war does not exist, and the same
authority which adjudges the necessity in one case must also determine it in the other.”).
170 See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
171 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
172 Nishimura Ekiu, 149 U.S. at 659.
173 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
174 Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
175 See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 304.
176 See id. at 316; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty:
Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of plenary Power over
Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2002).
177 See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 318.
168
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except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such
implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the
enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our
internal affairs.”178 According to the Court, sovereign powers over
external or international affairs never belonged to the states
separately but, rather, passed directly from Great Britain “to the
colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United
States.”179 The decision rendered the Constitution’s division of
powers irrelevant, since “[t]he powers to declare and wage war, to
conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations
with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the
Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as
necessary concomitants of nationality.”180 Included in these federal
external powers is control over immigration.181
The decision effectively overruled Miln, which treated the
several states as the inheritors of many sovereign rights at the end
of the American Revolution.182 Curtiss-Wright also clarified that
international law serves as the source of power; it “found the
warrant for its conclusions not in the provisions of the Constitution,
but in the law of nations.”183 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
confirmed its Curtiss-Wright decision to fully transition
immigration powers from an implied power needed by Congress in
support of its commerce powers and by the Executive under its
foreign affairs powers to a power “inherent in every sovereign state”
and divorced from the Constitution.184 In 2012, the Supreme Court
in Arizona v. United States explained that the federal government’s
power to control immigration “rests, in part, on the National
Government’s constitutional power to ‘establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization,’ and its inherent power as sovereign to control and

178

Id. at 315-16.
Id. at 316.
180 Id. at 318.
181 See id. (referencing Fong Yue Ting as authority on the subject).
182 See New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 102-03 (1837) (noting that states have
authority to pass and enforce laws so long as they do not conflict with the laws of
Congress).
183 Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 318.
184 Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587-88; see also Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395; see also
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005).
179
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conduct relations with foreign nations.”185
Overall, discerning the source of immigration powers is messy.
In fact, one scholar describes the search for the source of
immigration power as trying to “solve a larger mystery.”186
Treatises on immigration law regularly reference the variety of
different sources that may justify Congressional plenary power.187
For example, one treatise avoids any definitive statement of the
source of immigration powers, instead describing “clusters of
sources for immigration power [that] suggest themselves.”188 It
breaks down the potential sources of power to include (1)
constitutionally enumerated powers over naturalization, the
Migration and Importation Clause that protected the slave trade; the
Commerce Clause and war powers; (2) the extraconstitutional
sovereignty rights and foreign affairs powers; and (3) practical
considerations built on necessity, the structure of the Constitution
and consolidation of society.189
Part of the confusion over the source of immigration power may
be that the Supreme Court offers a wide variety of options to justify
federal powers, the strongest of which is extraconstitutional and
therefore the hardest to defend. It needed to reference as many
constitutional powers as possible to bolster what Americans are
otherwise taught is antithetical to our constitutional system.
185 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394-95 (citations omitted). Curtiss-Wright remains good law
despite several opinions that distinguish from its facts. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541
U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (recognizing continued application of “preconstitutional powers
necessarily inherent in any Federal Government” as “necessary concomitants of
nationality”) (referencing Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 315-22).
186 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 99 (2015).
187 See 1 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD
Y. WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 9.02 (2013), Lexis (database updated
quarterly); See THOMAS A. ALIENKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA &
MARYELLEN FULLERTONG, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 188-94 (7th ed. 2012).
188 Gordon, supra note 187, § 9.02.
189 See id; See ALIENKOFF ET AL., supra note 187, at 155-94. This book similarly
breaks down the sources of powers to include the enumerated powers from the Commerce
Clause, Naturalization Clause, War Powers Clause, and the amorphous set of foreign
affairs powers that include the President’s powers to make treaties, and to send and receive
ambassadorships; inherent power – which is inherent sovereignty; and constructional and
structural arguments. Still another treatise divides the sources between powers enumerated
in the Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause and Naturalization Clause, and implied
powers that include inherent sovereignty. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 186, at
100-06.
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Another explanation is simply sloppiness–absolute power over
immigration has existed since The Chinese Exclusion Case, but the
justification for it has changed over time. It is not necessary to
determine the source of plenary power if the goal is simply to
enforce it. For example, the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in
Dept. of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam found that:
“[T]he power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign
prerogative”; the Constitution gives “the political department of
the government” plenary authority to decide which aliens to
admit; and a concomitant of that power is the power to set the
procedures to be followed in determining whether an alien should
be admitted.190

The Court cites the 1892 case Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
which describes immigration power as an inherent sovereign right
that the Constitution then distributes to Congress under the
Commerce Clause, treaty powers, foreign relations, naturalization
and war powers–basically any part of the Constitution that grants
the federal government powers in the international arena.191 In
contrast, the citation trail for Congressional plenary power in the
2003 Demore v. Kim decision leads to Mathews v. Diaz, which
quotes Harisiades v. Shaughnessy.192 The Harisiades decision
explains that plenary power is built on sovereignty rights:
That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after long residence is
a practice that bristles with severities. But it is a weapon of
defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power
inherent in every sovereign state. Such is the traditional power of
the Nation over the alien and we leave the law on the subject as
we find it.193

For those who would treat Congressional plenary power over
immigration as a constitutional power, the difficulty is that none of
the constitutional powers referenced in support of federal
immigration powers, not even combined, provide the breadth of
powers the federal government now claims. This absence of
190 Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S.Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 659 (1892)).
191 See id.
192 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003). The full citation it employs reads
“[Mathews v. Diaz], 426 U.S. [67,] 81, n. 17 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 588-589 (1952)).”
193 Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587-88.

482

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVII

authority was the very reason the Supreme Court struggled to find
constitutional support for federal monopoly on those powers in the
earliest cases. For the sake of thoroughness, however, it is worth
running through all constitutional powers named in support of
Congressional plenary power over immigration. Notably, the
Constitution does not expressly grant the federal government
wholesale foreign affairs power. The foreign affairs power, rather,
appears to be an amalgamation of Congress’s powers to “regulate
commerce with foreign nations, to define offenses against the law
of nations, and to declare war,” and the President’s powers “to make
treaties and to send and receive ambassadors.”194 One more
provision rounds out constitutional support for federal immigration
powers: the naturalization provision that grants the federal
government the power to “establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization,” or a law for granting naturalized citizenship.195 On
its face, the naturalization provision seems the strongest candidate
for immigration powers, except that it applies only to the narrow
subject of making a noncitizen a citizen and has no application to
removal proceedings.196 Nor is there a direct connection between
full range of these powers and the Commerce Clause, as captured
by Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Edwards v. California:
[T]he migrations of a human being, of whom it is charged that he
possesses nothing that can be sold and has no wherewithal to buy,
do not fit easily into my notions as to what is commerce. To hold
that the measure of his rights is the commerce clause is likely to
result eventually either in distorting the commercial law or in
denaturing human rights.197

War powers are also too narrow to support all immigration
powers, since they apply only in the narrow circumstance of war.
The remaining federal powers of receiving ambassadors, defining
offenses under international law and treaty making also provide no
support for full immigration powers. This leaves the basis of
Congressional plenary power over immigration either the wholly
extraconstitutional, inherent sovereignty rights or a combination of
extraconstitutional sovereignty rights and the enumerated
constitutional powers over international commerce, naturalization
194
195
196
197

GORDON ET AL., supra note 187, § 9.02 n.19.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
See id.; GORDON ET AL., supra note 187, § 9.02(1)(b).
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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and war. For the sake of thoroughness, this Article will treat the
latter as the source of plenary power;by doing so, it can then address
how to use these sources of power to do more than dent those
powers but instead grant noncitizens in immigration proceedings the
rights to which they are otherwise entitled under international and
constitutional law.
The Supreme Court’s decision to vest immigration power in the
federal government is not the issue at the heart of this Article.
Rather, the decision to imbue the federal government with nearly
unchecked power over immigration is. By itself, shifting
immigration powers solely to the federal government did not make
Congressional plenary power inevitable or even likely. Rather, the
Supreme Court took the opportunity to build immigration powers
on an extraconstitutional source and constitutional foreign affairs
and national security powers so it could expand federal powers. Part
III next explores how the Court unmoored immigration powers from
any meaningful limitation by employing the concept of absolute
sovereignty and then removed much constitutional oversight by
relying initially on the political question doctrine and later the
extraordinary deference the Court believed foreign affairs and
national security powers justify. It underscores that by locating a
separate, nearly absolute source of power in international law and
proclaiming it mostly a political question subject to extraordinary
deference, the Court established “‘a secret reservoir of
unaccountable power’” that “‘makes shambles out of the very idea
of a constitutionally limited government.’”198
III.

Absolute Sovereignty is Absolute Power
The Supreme Court conceives of Congress’ immigration powers
as nearly absolute or unrestrained by the Constitution or
international law. While it has applied both substantive and
procedural due process increasingly to check other areas of
Congressional and Executive power, the Court has used
international law’s inherent sovereignty rights, which historically
were absolute, and extraordinary deference to foreign affairs and
national security powers to create and protect Congressional plenary

198 Louis Fischer, “The Law”: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ”
Doctrine, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 150 (2007) (quoting David M. Levitan, The
Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J.
467, 493, 497 (1946)).
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power over immigration.199 Part A details the Supreme Court’s
conception of the absolute sovereign right to control immigration
that underpins the powers it granted directly to the federal
government. Part B describes how the Supreme Court then relies
on the categorization of immigration as a foreign affairs and
national security matter to justify labelling much of immigration
law and policy a political matter subject to extraordinary deference,
stripping the Judiciary of the bulk of its power of judicial review.
A. Absolute Sovereign Right
The Chinese Exclusion Case, the first decision to identify
sovereignty rights as an extraconstitutional source of immigration
powers, envisioned Constitutional and public policy restrictions on
immigration powers. The case described the constitutionally
enumerated foreign affairs powers that it used to underpin federal
immigration power as “restricted in [its] exercise only by the
Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice
which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.”200
The latter part of the sentence is a reference to international law,
which is also termed the law of nations. The idea of Constitutional
or international law boundaries, however, never gained traction;
what took hold instead was the Court’s statement that:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of
sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States as
a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution,
the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the
government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be
granted away or restrained on behalf of [anyone].201

That statement captures two ideas: absolute sovereignty and
sovereign equality. Absolute sovereignty in practice means that
countries have total, unlimited control over their territory, and they
must consent before international law becomes binding on them,
including any restrictions placed on sovereignty rights. Thus,
allowing another country to limit the United States’ immigration
powers would make the United States “subject to the control of

199 See, e.g., Raquel E. Aldana & Thomas O’Donnell, A Look Back at the Warren
Court’s Due Process Revolution Through the Lens of Immigrants, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 633,
634-35 (2020).
200 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889).
201 Id. at 609.
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another power” in violation of sovereign equality, as described in
Part II(A) above.202 This statement should be read with the
knowledge that at issue in the case was whether congressional
legislation can override a United States treaty with China that
allowed easy migration of Chinese citizens to the United States. For
the Court, allowing China or Chinese citizens to enforce that treaty
against congressional wishes was a violation of sovereign equality,
despite the government’s prior consent to the treaty.203
Fong Yue Ting, quoting in part The Chinese Exclusion Case,
next described federal immigration power as “absolute and
unqualified.”204 It rested its opinion on international law:
“The power of the government to exclude foreigners from the
country, whenever, in its judgment, the public interests require
such exclusion, has been asserted in repeated instances, and never
denied by the executive or legislative departments.”

This statement was supported by many citations from the
diplomatic correspondence of successive Secretaries of State,
collected in Wharton’s International Law Digest, §206.205
By 1909, the Court, in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, compiled an extensive list of immigration powers built
on precedent that form part of federal absolute power:
Repeated decisions of this Court have determined that Congress
has the power to exclude aliens from the United States; to
prescribe the terms and conditions on which they may come in; to
establish regulations for sending out of the country such aliens as
have entered in violation of law, and to commit the enforcement
of such conditions and regulations to executive officers; that the
deportation of an alien who is found to be here in violation of law
is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and that
the provisions of the Constitution securing the right of trial by jury
have no application.206

The Court explicitly described these powers as “absolute,”
declaring, on the basis of the weight of precedent, that “over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more

202

Id. at 604.
See id. at 604.
204 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 708 (1893).
205 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606-07).
206 Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 335 (1909) (quoting
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 289-90 (1904)).
203
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complete than it is over” immigration.207
The effect of defining immigration powers as absolute is to pass
on those powers to the federal government unrestricted by
international law. At the time of these early decisions, sovereignty
rights, including over immigration, were relatively absolute and the
Supreme Court’s statements were an accurate reflection of
international law. In the post-World War II era, however, much of
the world, including the United States, adopted international human
rights law as an explicit restriction on those absolute sovereignty
rights, including with respect to immigration powers. As Part IV(A)
explores, the Supreme Court uses the weight of precedent to avoid
having to apply these new restrictions, although other Supreme
Court jurisprudence recognizes that the government, including the
Court, are required to follow international law as it is now and not
as it once was.208
B. Extraordinary Judicial Deference
Proclaiming sovereignty rights as absolute, even if that is now a
legal fiction, should not insulate federal immigration powers from
constitutional review. To the extent the Supreme Court relies on the
amorphous category of constitutional foreign affairs and national
security powers to justify granting immigration powers to the
federal government, Constitutional limits on government powers
apply. The Constitution does not just divide the labor of governing,
it also limits the manner in which the government can act. The
Supreme Court initially employed the political question doctrine to
avoid those constitutional limits and later a form of extraordinary
judicial deference to accomplish roughly the same goal.209 The
Court did so by connecting immigration to foreign affairs and
national security, which to the Supreme Court were matters best left
to the political branches of government.
The Supreme Court first proclaimed this connection in The
Chinese Exclusion Case when it refused to review the Executive’s
decision to breach its treaty with China on the basis that the
“promise contained in a treaty” is not a “judicial question;” rather,
it “belongs to diplomacy and legislation, and not the administration

207
208
209

Id. at 342, 339.
See infra Part IV(A).
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 602
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of existing law.”210 Although this case was specifically a dispute
over a treaty between the United States and a foreign government,
which directly implicates foreign affairs, the Court continues to
restrict its judicial oversight even when there is no specific treaty at
issue and no particular country’s citizens are targeted by
immigration law and policy – removing that direct connection to
foreign relations and national security.
By the time the Court decided Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
the Supreme Court moved away from invoking the political
question doctrine to render immigration law and policy
nonjusticiable, but it invoked inherent sovereignty and the political
nature of foreign affairs powers to strip the Constitution’s Due
Process Clause of any real meaning in immigration proceedings.211
Similarly, faced with the question of the constitutionality of
requiring Chinese immigrants to provide “one credible white
witness” to prove their residency in the United States, which would
entitle them to remain there under the Chinese Exclusion Act, the
Supreme Court in Fong Yue Ting warned that it must be “careful
that it does not undertake to pass upon political questions” before
refusing to overturn it.212 The Court explained that it had little
power to overturn actions carried out according to powers wholly
conferred to Congress.213
In the 1903 Japanese Immigrant Case, the Supreme Court
rejected the government’s argument that its immigration powers are
not subject to judicial oversight and imposed a due process
requirement of a hearing before a person could be deported,
regardless of whether the person arrived in the United States
legally.214 The Court justified its holding on the need to “bring
[immigration statutes] into harmony with the Constitution,” rather
than on the basis that the Due Process Clause applied to immigration
law and policy.215 The Court then proceeded to strip that
requirement of any real teeth when it refused to judge the quality of
the hearing or whether substantive due process was met:
It is true that she pleads a want of knowledge of our language, that
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id.
See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
Fong Yue Ting, 142 U.S. at 712, 731.
See id.
Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).
See id. at 100-01.
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she did not understand the nature and import of the questions
propounded to her, that the investigation made was a “pretended”
one, and that she did not, at the time, know that the investigation
had reference to her being deported from the country. These
considerations cannot justify the intervention of the courts.216

Over time, the Court established a standard of extraordinary
deference to the political branches on immigration law and policy.
The Court, in the 1977 Fiallo v. Bell case, explicated:
At the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of
judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has
repeatedly emphasized that “over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” the
admission of aliens. Our cases “have long recognized the power
to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government’s political departments largely
immune from judicial control.” Our recent decisions have not
departed from this long-established rule. Just last Term, for
example, the Court had occasion to note that “the power over
aliens is of a political character, and therefore subject only to
narrow judicial review.” And we observed recently that, in the
exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization,
“Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens.”217

The Court describes this as “special judicial deference.”218 The
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this deference in Trump v.
Hawaii, citing specifically this section of the Fiallo decision.219
216

Id. at 101-02.
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citations omitted). See also Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (“For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for
regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been
committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in these
matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of
classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic
circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the
Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary. This very case illustrates the need for
flexibility in policy choices, rather than the rigidity often characteristic of constitutional
adjudication.”).
218 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 793.
219 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at
792). Cf. id. (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (“[A]ny
policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies
in regard to the conduct of foreign relations [and] the war power.”)); id. at 2418-19
217
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To be clear, absolute immigration power does not mean that due
process is never a consideration for the judiciary. Rather, when the
Court does engage with a due process review, extraordinary judicial
deference leads the Court to apply something akin to the
administrative law standard of whether the government action was
reasonable, rather than the strict constitutional standard required by
the 5th Amendment.220 In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court described its
“circumscribed judicial inquiry” over immigration as requiring it to
seek nothing more than “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason”
for the government’s immigration law or policy.221 When faced
with a complaint that the Trump Administration was fulfilling
President Trump’s campaign promise to impose a discriminatory
ban on Muslim immigration when it temporarily stopped
immigration from some Muslim-majority countries, the Court
accepted the Administration’s national security justification and
refused “to look behind the exercise” of the President’s delegated
discretion to regulate immigration.222
C. The Net Effect
The net effect of combining absolute sovereign rights over
immigration with extraordinary judicial deference is to allow
Congress and the Supreme Court to sidestep any real oversight of
immigration law. The 2018 Trump v Hawaii decision, for example,
confirmed this effect:
For more than a century, this Court has recognized that the
admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a “fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political
departments largely immune from judicial control.” . . . Because
decisions in these matters may implicate “relations with foreign
powers,” or involve “classifications defined in the light of
changing political and economic circumstances,” such judgments
“are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the

(quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81 (noting that decisions in these matters may implicate
“relations with foreign powers,” or involve “classifications defined in the light of changing
political and economic circumstances,” such judgments “are frequently of a character more
appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive.”)).
220 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 528-31 (2003) (applying something like a
reasonableness standard by evaluating whether the statute achieves the goals Congress set
for it).
221 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419.
222 Id. at 2417-19.

490

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVII

Legislature or the Executive.”223

The Supreme Court is well aware of the gross unfairness of
Congressional plenary power over immigration, but it finds the
weight of precedent too heavy to overturn it. Starting in the 1950s,
the Supreme Court began expressing consternation over the nearly
absolute power it granted Congress and the Executive, describing
how it “bristles with severities,” yet it continued to justify this
power as “a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by
international law.”224 The Court lamented the lack of fairness in
immigration law even as it upheld the government’s power to deport
a noncitizen after he was “duped into joining the Communist
Party.”225 The Court stated that if it were “writing on a clean slate,”
given that “deportation may . . . deprive a man ‘of all that makes life
worth living,’” it would apply substantive due process to limit
Congress’ power.226 Instead, the Justices found their hands tied by
“not merely ‘a page in history, but a whole volume.’”227 Although
the Court’s recitation of this rule became rote, its lament that it could
not approach immigration powers differently seemed to fall by the
wayside.228
In contrast to this pessimistic view, a myriad of scholars suggest
that the Supreme Court has been watering down Congressional
plenary power over the last several decades.229 Their primary

223 Id. at 2418-19 (citations omitted) (quoting, respectively, Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792,
and Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81).
224 Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587-88.
225 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954).
226 Id.
227 Id. at 531 (citation omitted).
228 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1972) (“Since [Chinese
Exclusion], the Court’s general reaffirmations of this principle have been legion.”);
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003) (“[S]ince Mathews, this Court has firmly
and repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”); Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2417 (“For more than
a century, this Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals
is . . . ‘largely immune from judicial control.’”).
229 Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration “Disaggregation” and the Mainstreaming of
Immigration Law, 68 FLA. L. REV. F. 38, 39 (2016); Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in
the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 77, 79 (2017); Andrew Kent,
Disappearing Legal Black Holes and Converging Domains: Changing Individual Rights
Protection in National Security and Foreign Affairs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1052
(2015); Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47
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evidence comes from the Court’s 2001 decision in Zadvydas v.
Davis.230 In Zadvydas, the Court determined that the government
could not indefinitely detain a noncitizen who was ordered removed
but who could not be safely deported to another country.231 The
Court ruled that the government has the power to detain an
immigrant while working towards her deportation, but in this
instance, where deportation is impossible, continued detention was
unreasonable.232 While it is wholly possible that the Court was
seeking to circumvent the nearly absolute power it granted Congress
over immigration, the reality is that it utilized statutory
interpretation, not constitutional rights, to justify ending indefinite
detention.233 The decision employed the constitutional avoidance
canon, which is a “‘cardinal principle’ of statutory interpretation . . .
that when an Act of Congress raises ‘a serious doubt’ as to its
constitutionality, ‘this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.’”234 The Court determined that indefinite detention
to achieve an unachievable purpose would be a violation of the
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment because it did not fall into an
established form of permissible indefinite detention, and that
unachievable goal could not justify creating a new one: “where
detention’s goal is no longer practically attainable, detention no
longer ‘bear[s] [a] reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual [was] committed.’”235 The Court used the canon to avoid
this unconstitutional result, although the government attempted to
invoke Congressional plenary power to justify continued
detention.236 The Court could not find an intention in the

CONN. L. REV. 879, 885 (2015); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization
of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1929 (2015).
230 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 229, at 42-43; Kim, supra note 229, at 88.
231 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
232 Id. at 699-700.
233 See id.
234 Id. at 689. Zadvydas built on earlier immigration cases that similarly interpreted
ambiguous elements of the Immigration and Nationality Act to avoid constitutional
violations. For example, in Woodby v. INS, the Supreme Court required that the
government prove deportability using a clear and convincing evidence standard because
the Act was silent on the matter, leaving it to the judiciary to decide. 385 U.S. 276, 284,
286 (1966).
235 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
236 Id. at 695.
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immigration legislation to permit indefinite detention.237
While this decision provides at least a modicum of liberty rights
to noncitizens, it fails to challenge Congressional plenary power. It
checked congressional power not as a matter of right but because
the statute was unclear about whether the government could hold
detainees indefinitely. The Court is unambiguous on this point:
Despite this constitutional problem, if “Congress has made its
intent” in the statute “clear, ‘we must give effect to that intent.’“
We cannot find here, however, any clear indication of
congressional intent to grant the Attorney General the power to
hold indefinitely in confinement an alien ordered removed.238

The canon is an extremely limited and easily undermined outlet
for achieving substantive due process.239 As the Court explained in
Clark v. Martinez:
It is a tool for choosing between competing plausible
interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable
presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which
raises serious constitutional doubts. The canon is thus a means of
giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting it.240

The Zadvydas ruling was followed by two more decisions that
underscore its failure to effectively limit Congressional plenary
power. In Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court upheld mandatory
immigration detention without an individualized hearing for certain
classes of noncitizens–a clear Due Process Clause violation as
described in Part II(A) above–on the basis of Congressional plenary
power.241 Additionally, in its 2018 Jennings v. Rodriguez decision,
the Court refused to employ the constitutional avoidance canon to
invalidate indefinite, mandatory immigration detention, finding it

237

See id. at 696-97.
Id.
239 See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1627 n.11
(1992) (“The nominally subconstitutional reasoning [employed in statutory interpretation]
often has deep roots in mainstream constitutional law, but in immigration law it remains a
‘phantom’—real enough to influence statutory interpretation, but not real enough to
govern explicitly constitutional decisions in the face of the plenary power doctrine.”); cf.
David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV.
29, 53 (2015) (locating the remedy for violations of non-citizens’ rights in the political
branches).
240 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381-82 (2005) (citations omitted).
241 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003).
238
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inapplicable given Congress’ clear intent to permit indefinite
detention for some categories of noncitizens.242
The Supreme Court continues to use Congressional plenary
power to mostly shield immigration law from due process
challenges, allowing the federal government to grossly violate
immigrants’ rights. It does so without any meaningful consideration
of whether the source of power–international law’s sovereignty
rights and foreign affairs and national security powers–permit those
violations or of what it means for international law to be a source of
power. The Court effectively abdicates its obligations to enforce
the limits on immigration power set by international law by hiding
behind extraordinary judicial deference it grants this area of law.
The next section examines potential challenges to Congressional
plenary power that build on this understanding of international law
as a source of power and that highlight the incoherency of the
Supreme Court jurisprudence on inherent sovereignty and foreign
affairs and national security powers. The section underscores the
assertion that the only thing propping up plenary power is the
weight of precedent, since neither inherent sovereignty nor foreign
affairs and national security powers justify the nearly absolute
power to violate noncitizens’ rights.243
IV.

What the Supreme Court Gets Wrong: A Better
Challenge to Congressional Plenary Power
Part IV is dedicated to identifying the weaknesses in the
Supreme Court’s Congressional plenary power jurisprudence that
immigrant rights activists may be able to exploit to finally topple
nearly absolute immigration power. Most importantly, it highlights
that the foundation for that power—sovereignty rights and foreign
affairs and national sovereignty powers—is too deteriorated to
support Congressional plenary power. The main source of
immigration power is international law. But, as Section A shows,
242 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842, 851 (2018); see also id. at 869 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696) (“The question remains whether it is
possible to read the statute as authorizing bail. As desirable as a constitutional
interpretation of a statute may be, we cannot read it to say the opposite of what its language
states. The word “animal” does not include minerals, no matter how strongly one might
wish that it did. Indeed, where “‘Congress has made its intent in the statute clear, we must
give effect to that intent,’” even if doing so requires us to consider the constitutional
question, and even if doing so means that we hold the statute unconstitutional.”).
243 See infra Part IV.
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international law does not allow countries to violate immigrant
rights to liberty, non-discrimination and equal protection of the law,
even in the exercise of their sovereign right to control immigration.
For example, it prohibits any type of mandatory detention and it
requires immigration hearings to comply fully with due process
requirements. Section A also underscores that the Supreme Court’s
failure to protect these rights is a direct result of its failure to address
what it means for international law to be a source of power, rather
than a type of law on the same footing as Congressional legislation.
If international law is truly the source of power, the Supreme Court
can no longer justify its general refusal to provide meaningful limits
to Congress’ and, by delegation, the Executive’s immigration
powers. Section B then tackles how the Court inappropriately hides
behind its framing of foreign affairs and national security powers as
inherently political to avoid meaningful judicial oversight of
immigration powers in light of the structure of international law and
the Court’s rejection of the framing in the enemy combatant
detention and other decisions. International law makes clear that
human rights are legally binding obligations enforceable in
domestic courts, not merely political considerations. And, outside
of the context of immigration law and policy, the Supreme Court
refuses to treat the political branches’ national security and foreign
affairs powers as subject to the same extraordinary deference.
Whether international law or the Constitution is a source of power,
or both, the federal government does not have the authority to
grossly violate noncitizens’ rights. It is time for the Supreme Court
to stop shirking its oversight responsibilities on the basis of a nearly
absolute power that only its precedent permits.
A. Limitations on Inherent Sovereignty: International Human
Rights Law
The first essential element to challenging Congressional plenary
power is challenging the Supreme Court’s interpretation of inherent
sovereignty as absolute sovereignty. At the time the Supreme Court
developed Congressional plenary power over immigration,
international law considered sovereignty rights absolute. Absolute
sovereignty as a concept treated “sovereign authority as exclusive,
autonomous, and independent.”244 This concept was meant to
244

Ernesto Hernandez-Lopez, Sovereignty Migrates in U.S. and Mexican Law:
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regulate relations between countries to guarantee peace. This left
no room for ambiguity: states could not interfere in each other’s
domestic affairs, attack each other’s territorial or political integrity,
or otherwise challenge each other’s sovereign authority over their
territory and they were all equal. Under this structure, individuals–
citizens and noncitizens alike–had no enforceable rights under
international law.245 The Supreme Court’s initial decision to make
immigration powers absolute was consistent with international law
at the time.
The era of absolute sovereignty came to an end with World War
II and the development of International Human Rights Law
(“IHRL”).246 The horrors of two World Wars and the mass atrocities
during the Holocaust led to a new world order in which countries
agreed to circumscribe their sovereignty rights in favor of human
rights for everyone.247 The Nuremberg Trials, along with the
development of crimes against humanity, created a new
international obligation: states were required to refrain from
widespread and systematic abuse of any population.248 The
tribunals stripped away one of the primary defenses governments
claimed when committing horrific human rights abuses–that states
had complete sovereign authority over their territory and anyone in
it and, therefore, all other states must refrain from interfering in that
authority.249
The United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter makes clear the
international intention to limit sovereignty rights to better protect
human rights. Along with codifying sovereignty rights in Article 2,
as described above, the Charter expresses in Article 1 that one of
the U.N.’s primary purposes is to “promot[e] and encourag[e]
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”250 The
Transnational Influences in plenary Power and Non-Intervention, 40 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1345, 1360 (2007).
245 Jeffrey Kahn, “Protection and Empire”: The Martens Clause, State Sovereignty,
and Individual Rights, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2016).
246 Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV.
965, 971 (1998).
247 Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign
Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1074 (1985).
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3.
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Charter envisioned human rights as a check on sovereignty rights,
although it does not itself guarantee human rights. Rather, IHRL
developed primarily through the adoption of multilateral human
rights treaties, customary international law and jus cogens norms.
Because sovereign equality means that no authority can impose
rules or limits on a country without its consent, international law is
a consent-based system. The human rights treaties bind only those
states that ratify them. Customary international law is created by “a
general and consistent practice of states that they follow from a
sense of legal obligation.”251 The general and consistent practice is
considered implicit consent, with only states that can show they are
persistent objectors to customary international law exempted from
its obligations. To qualify as a persistent objector, a country must
expressly and continuously declare to the international community
its objection, starting at the time of the creation of the customary
law norm.252 Jus cogens norms, in contrast, are considered so
fundamental that no country can object to them or derogate from
them.253 They are identified by nearly universal consent of the
international community. As with customary international law,
consent is shown implicitly through state practice. The remainder
of this section examines the limitations IHRL places on the
sovereign right to control who enters and remains in the country’s
territory and whether and under what conditions the United States
has consented to these limits.
1. Limits on the Sovereign Right to Control Immigration
While international law certainly grants countries the sovereign
right to determine who may enter and remain in the country, IHRL
limits how the government may treat noncitizens during the process
of exercising that right. The bedrock of human rights for
noncitizens facing detention and deportation, and therefore limits
on sovereign powers, is customary international law, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),
251 LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
CUSTOMARY
INT’L
L.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law [https://perma.cc/DH27JT3W] (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
252 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, NGO Manual on Int’l and Reg’l Instruments
Concerning Refugees and Hum. Rights, Eur. Series, Vol. 4, No. 2, at xiii (July 1998)
[hereinafter NGO Manual].
253 See U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Grp. on Arbitrary Det., ¶ 51,
A/HRC/22/44 (Dec. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Working Grp. 2012].
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and the International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (“CERD”). The ICCPR and CERD are multilateral
treaties written under the auspices of the United Nations. Together,
these sources of international law guarantee noncitizens the rights
to liberty, and correspondingly freedom from arbitrary detention;
nondiscrimination; and equal treatment under the law.254 IHRL does
not grant a noncitizen a right to enter or remain in a country; that
right remains a sovereign prerogative.255 As such, the human right
to freedom of movement into and within a territory belongs only to
those “lawfully within the territory of the state.”256
The starting point for understanding how IHRL limits sovereign
immigration powers is the right to be free from discrimination, a
right closely tied to the right to equal protection under the law. The
right to be free from discrimination is binding as a matter of
customary international law.257 It was first expressed in the
nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).
Article 2 reads: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Declaration, without discrimination of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth of other status.”258
ICCPR Article 2 contains similar language:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social

254 See Int’l Covenant on Civ. and Pol. Rts. arts. 2, 9, 26, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Int’l Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 5, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
255 See U.N. Hum. Rts, Comm., CCPR Gen. Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens
under the Covenant, 27th Sess. (Apr. 11, 1986), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, ¶ 5 (1994)
[hereinafter HRC No. 15] (reiterating that “[t]he Covenant does not recognize the right of
aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party. It is in principle a matter for the
State to decide who it will admit to its territory.”).
256 ICCPR, supra note 254, art. 12(1). The only other right that excludes noncitizens
is the right of citizens to public participation.
257 Rule 88. Non-Discrimination, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule88 [https://perma.cc/5THB-77MY]
(last visited Jan. 18, 2022) [hereinafter ICRC Rule 88].
258 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Hum. Rts., art. 2 (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
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origin, property, birth or other status.259

One of the core tenants of IHRL is that human rights belong to
everybody regardless of where they live and regardless of national
law and citizenship.260 The United Nations Human Rights Council
(“HRC”), the treaty body created by the ICCPR to interpret and
monitor implementation of ICCPR rights, has determined that states
must guarantee each right “without discrimination between citizens
and noncitizens” as part of the prohibition on discrimination on the
basis of national origin.261 Under IHRL, the only right that belongs
solely to citizens is the right to public participation in the
government, which includes the right to choose a government.262
CERD’s guarantee of equality for noncitizens is more
complicated because Article 1(2) specifically states that its
prohibition on discrimination does “not apply to distinctions,
exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this
Convention between citizens and non-citizens.”263 The Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the treaty body
responsible for interpreting and monitoring the implementation of
CERD, explains that Article 1(2) “must be construed so as to avoid
undermining the basic prohibition of discrimination; hence, it
should not be interpreted to detract in any way from the rights and
freedoms recognized” by IHRL.264 As such, the CERD Committee
reads Article 1(2) as recognizing that there might be legitimate
reasons to differentiate between citizens and noncitizens, such as
with the right to public participation, but that such recognition does
not grant governments a license to discriminate against
noncitizens.265

259

ICCPR, supra note 254, art. 2(1).
See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation 30: Discrimination against non-citizens, ¶ 1, (2004) U.N. Doc
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/ rev.3. (mentioning that this core tenant can be found in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the ICCPR; the ICERD,
the Charter of the United Nations; and the UDHR) [hereinafter General Recommendation
30].
261 HRC No. 15, supra note 255, ¶¶ 1-2.
262 See ICCPR, supra note 254, art. 25.
263 CERD, supra note 254, art. 1(2).
264 U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CERD Gen.
Recommendation XXX on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, ¶ 2, (Oct. 1, 2002)
[hereinafter CERD Committee].
265 See id. at ¶ 3.
260
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A major component of nondiscrimination is the right to equality
under the law. ICCPR Article 26 and CERD Article 5 protect this
right.266 The right to equality under the law sits in tension with the
sovereign right of governments to determine who may enter and
remain in the county and under what conditions. The sovereign
right allows for differentiation that human rights law does not.
IHRL manages tensions between rights by allowing limitations on
rights when appropriate. The CERD Committee articulates the test
for whether differentiation between citizens and noncitizens is an
appropriate limitation on rights as a consideration of the following
two elements: (1) whether differentiation serves a legitimate aim;
and (2) whether the distinction is “proportional to the achievement
of this aim.”267 The Human Rights Committee employs the same
test to determine when a state can limit ICCPR rights.268
Applying this test to the United States’ immigration detention
process described in Part I(b) to highlight how these rights operate,
the question is whether immigration detention violates equal
protection for the right to liberty. As with any right, governments
may limit liberty but not arbitrarily. The prohibition on arbitrary
detention is captured in UDHR Article 9, ICCPR Article 9 and
CERD Article 5, which protect the right to liberty or “freedom from
confinement of the body.”269 Under IHRL, detention must be the
exception, not the rule.270 All people are entitled to protection
against arbitrary detention, including “aliens, refugees and asylum
seekers, stateless persons [and] migrant workers.”271 The U.N.
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) determined
266

CERD, supra note 254, art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 254, art. 25.
Id. at ¶ 4.
268 See OHCHR, Civ. and Pol. Rts.: The Hum. Rts. Comm., at 8, No. 15 (Rev.1) (May
2005), (It emphasizes “that in any case the permissible limits are neither wide nor
generous, and certainly do not permit a State party effectively to void a certain right of
practical meaning. The burden of justification in such a case lies with the State party to
show, including to the Committee, that a certain limitation satisfies the tests of legality,
necessity, reasonableness and legitimate purpose.”).
269 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 35: Art. 9 (Liberty and security of
person), 112th Sess., (Dec. 6, 2014), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, ¶ 3 [hereinafter HRC No.
35].
270 See U.N. Working Grp. on Arbitrary Det., Compilation of Deliberations (2013) ¶
43 (affirming a consensus that “the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty is of a
universally binding nature under customary international law”) [hereinafter Compilation
of Deliberations].
271 HRC No. 35, supra note 269, ¶ 3.
267
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the right to liberty and prohibition on arbitrary detention is so
universally accepted (or consented to) that it constitutes both
customary international law and a jus cogens norm.272 It reached
this conclusion based on the fact that the right and corresponding
prohibition are protected “in all major international and regional
instruments for the promotion and protection of human rights,”
including the ICCPR, which has been ratified by 172 states
including the United States.273 Adding weight to the customary law
and jus cogens status, signatories to the ICCPR and the other human
rights treaties protect the right to liberty in their constitutions and in
national law, again including the United States.274 The ICRC noted
that the United States’ national law has contributed to the
development of the right to liberty and prohibition on arbitrary
detention as customary international law, including with respect to
detention of suspected terrorists following 9/11 and through its
adoption of the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 at Nuremberg,
which treated “imprisonment . . . or other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population” as a crime against humanity.275
Under IHRL, detention is arbitrary if there is no legal basis for
holding a person or if the procedure for detaining a person is
arbitrary.276 To ensure the detention is nonarbitrary, ICCPR Article
9 grants all detainees the right “to take proceedings before a court,
in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness
of his detention and order his release if the detention is not
lawful.”277 The Human Rights Committee expressly prohibits
detention without the possibility of periodic review or any type of
mandatory detention, treating it as inherently arbitrary.278 In terms

272

See Compilation of Deliberations, supra note 270, ¶ 42.
Id; see also FAQ: The Covenant on Civ. and Pol. Rts. (ICCPR), ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/faq-covenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr
[https://perma.cc/55QU-7V39] (last updated Apr. 2019).
274 See Compilation of Deliberations, supra note 270, ¶ 43.
275 Practice Relating to Rule 99. Deprivation of Liberty, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule99
[https://perma.cc/3RVE-SD72] (last visited Jan. 19, 2022) [hereinafter ICRC Rule 99].
276 See HRC No. 35, supra note 269, ¶ 12.
277 ICCPR, supra note 254, art. 9(4).
278 See id. art. 15. Additionally, the UNWGAD determined that detainees are entitled
to automatic, prompt review of the detention decision, meaning the government is
implicitly required to hold a hearing regardless of whether a noncitizen requests one; see
273
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of process, its test for nonarbitrary detention is whether the
detention is (1) permitted by law; (2) reasonable; (3) necessary; and
(4) proportionate “in the light of the circumstances.”279 The Human
Rights Committee anticipates at least three grounds for detaining
immigrants while deciding on their asylum status and that,
presumably, apply to all forms of immigration detention: (1) risk of
flight; (2) danger to others; and (3) national security threats.280
Necessity requires the courts to “take into account less invasive
means of achieving the same ends, such as reporting obligations,
sureties or other conditions to prevent absconding.”281
Proportionality requires courts to take into account whether
detention will harm the detainee’s mental or physical health.282
Overall, the arbitrariness test is meant to incorporate considerations
of “inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due
process of law.”283
In 2017, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention (“UNWGAD”) issued a report on the extent to which the
United States has complied with its human rights obligations with
respect to immigration detention. The Group listed five areas of
concern with the U.S. detention regime, including mandatory
detention, failure to assess the need for detention on an individual
basis, and failure to ensure adequate access to legal assistance.284
Additionally, the UNWGAD raised concerns that efforts to use
detention as a form of immigration deterrence were meant to, and
might, deter legitimate asylum claims.285 Importantly, UNWGAD
acknowledged the difficulties the United States faces balancing “a
large movement of immigrants” and “fully respecting [] human

also Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Grp. on Arbitrary Det. on its Visit to the U.S.
of Am., ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/37/Add.2 (July 17, 2017) [hereinafter Working Grp.
2017].
279 HRC No. 35, supra note 269, ¶ 18.
280 See id.
281 Id.
282 See id.
283 Id. at ¶12.
284 See Working Grp. 2017, supra note 278, ¶ 23. UNGWAD commented further that
even GPS monitoring and “excessive bond amounts” smacks of “criminal settings” and
that appropriate alternatives to detention include releasing individuals to family or
community custody; “non-monetary parole and release on recognizance.” See also HRC
No. 35, supra note 269, ¶ 30.
285 See Working Grp. 2017, supra note 278, ¶ 27.
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rights.”286 It found the United States’ balance inappropriate,
however, concluding instead that the high rates of detention are
“excessive” and “cannot be justified based on legitimate
necessity.”287
Overall, the United States’ regime for detaining immigrants
pending immigration proceedings violates international law.
Mandatory detention fails to guarantee an individual hearing for all
immigrants facing detention. Hearings are not required even when
detention is discretionary, but instead depend on an immigrant’s
request. The federal regulations do not require the government to
prove detention is necessary or that the harm from detention is
proportionate to the harm if a noncitizen does not appear at court
hearings or to the danger the immigrant poses. And the failure of
the immigration regulations to establish a standard of proof, leaving
it simply to each immigration judge to be satisfied, or not, that each
detainee is not a flight risk or dangerous, is inherently arbitrary as
each immigration judge can choose her own standard of proof.
These failures constitute violations of the right to liberty.
As Part II(A) showed, the standards governing pretrial and
mental health detention in the United States place the burden of
proof on the government to prove detention is necessary, take into
account the detainee’s liberty interests, and offer an individualized
hearing. Thus, they comply with IHRL requirements to avoid
arbitrary detention. It is more complicated to assess the compliance
of enemy combatant detention, because of the use of secret
evidence, the extended nature of detention, and a host of other
issues, but the placement of the burden and standard of proof in such
proceedings affords enemy combatants due process rights far more
in compliance with IHRL than those afforded to noncitizens facing
immigration detention.288 This differential treatment shows that the
immigration detention regime violates IHRL’s prohibition on
discrimination and its guarantee of equal protection of the law, in
addition to the right to liberty. The next section details the United
States’ consent to each of these rights, a necessary component to
finding these limitations binding on the government as a matter of
international law.

286
287
288

Id. at ¶ 21.
Id. at ¶ 31.
LUDSIN, supra note 26, at 369-70.
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V. United States’ Consent to IHRL
The United States’ specific consent to limits on its sovereign
right to determine who enters and remains in the country first comes
from customary international law. Again, customary international
law is binding on all states that have not persistently and loudly
objected to it from the time of its creation.289 According to the
Supreme Court, the United States is bound by customary
international law because it is based on state practice and, therefore,
“tacit consent.”290 Because of the element of tacit consent, the
Supreme Court treats customary law’s development as consistent
with the right to sovereign equality.291
The Court explained that it locates customary international law by
“resort . . . to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as
evidence of these, to works of jurists and commentators who by
years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves
peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.
Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be,
but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.”292

The work of UNWGAD, the ICRC and the Human Rights
Committee in cataloguing the creation of the customary
international law rights to liberty and equality under the law and the
prohibition on discrimination would undoubtedly fit the Court’s
requirement of expert research. Further, as noted in the previous
section, these groups identified U.S. practice as contributing to the
development of these rights as customary international law.
There are rampant debates about how international law becomes
part of U.S. law, more particularly around whether it forms part of

289

See NGO Manual, supra note 252, at xiii.
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 231 (1796) (Chace, J.); see also Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004) (describing customary international law as a source of
law “we have long, albeit cautiously, recognized”). Some scholars push back against the
idea of tacit consent to international law, preferring instead evidence of an intent to
consent. See e.g., Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary Int’l L.
Modifies Treaties, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 237, 240 (2016). The United States Constitution as
well as its ratification of the ICCPR and CERD show an intent to be bound by the rights
to liberty, equal protection of the law and freedom from discrimination.
291 Ware, 3 U.S. at 231. Later decisions do not challenge the issue of tacit consent but
recognize the customary international law is binding on countries. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S.
at 735.
292 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
290
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federal common law (whose existence is disputed) or must be
adopted by Congress. The Supreme Court cautiously recognizes
international law, including customary international law, as part of
federal common law.293 This debate, however, is irrelevant with
respect to federal immigration powers because international law is
a source of the power. In this context, international law is neither
subservient to the constitution nor equal to statutory or common
law. As the Court in The Paquete Habana described, “International
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination,” including by resort to customary international
law.294 Doubtless, when international law is the source of power,
any rights it grants are enforceable by courts without consideration
of whether Congress adopted it into law.
Additionally, the United States has ratified the ICCPR and the
CERD, which means it is bound by their terms on the international
plane and, therefore, when passing immigration laws and
regulations.295 Ratification is an act of sovereignty.296 The United
States has explicitly consented to be bound by to the right to liberty,
with its attendant due process obligations, the right to equal
protection of the law, and the prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of national origin, which covers immigration status.297 The
United States designated the ICCPR and CERD as non-selfexecuting,298 which means that ordinarily the courts cannot directly
enforce these limitations unless Congress passes legislation
implementing the treaties.299 Anyone seeking to avoid international
law’s limits is likely to raise this point as a barrier. In reality, the
designation of the ICCPR and CERD as non-self-executing poses
no limit on the application of the provisions of the treaties to

293

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (Paquete Habana is still good law); see also
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730.
295 See generally ICCPR, supra note 254; see also CERD, supra note 254.
296 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing that the United States can ratify a treaty only if
it is signed by the President and with the agreement of the Senate).
297 See generally ICCPR, supra note 254; see also CERD, supra note 254.
298 See 140 Cong. Rec. 14,326 (1994) (CERD); see also 138 Cong. Rec. 8,071 (1992)
(ICCPR).
299 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735.
294
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immigration law because they are a source of law, rather than
derivative of the Senate’s or Executive treaty powers. The United
States remains bound internationally by non-self-executing treaties,
regardless if they are enforceable in domestic courts.300 As such,
they form part of the source of immigration powers. Putting this
discussion into the context of constitutional supremacy,
constitutional guarantees do not depend on implementing
legislation not because they have been designated self-executing but
because the government does not have the authority to override its
boundaries. Even if the courts conclude otherwise, and even if the
United States were to withdraw from the treaties, the United States
remains bound by customary international law, making this
contention moot.
Another likely point of contention is that the United States
added an “understanding” to the ICCPR’s prohibition on
discrimination and to the guarantee of equal protection of the law
that some might read as permitting the extraordinary deference the
Supreme Court currently employs to restrict its oversight. The
understanding reads:
That the Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee all
persons equal protection of the law and provide extensive
protections against discrimination. The United States understands
distinctions based upon race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or any other status - as those terms are used in Article 2, paragraph
1 and Article 26 - to be permitted when such distinctions are, at
minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental

300 See Vienna Convention on the L. of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.,
331 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
to perform a treaty.”). While the US has not ratified the Vienna Convention, its provisions
are considered customary international law. LORI FISLER DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 115 (7th Ed. 2019) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 301 reporters’ note 1
(“Although the United States is not a party to the Convention, it accepts that the
Convention generally reflects international practice concerning treaties and that many of
its provisions are binding as a matter of customary international law.”)). The U.N. Human
Rights Committee, the treaty body created by the ICCPR, explains that Art. 27 “prevent[s]
States parties from invoking provisions of the constitutional law or other aspects of
domestic law to justify a failure to perform or give effect to obligations under the treaty.”
Hum. Rts. Comm., Gen. Comment No. 31, The Nature of the Gen. Legal Obligation
Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant ¶ 4, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (2004)
[hereinafter HRC No. 31].

506

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVII

objective. The United States further understands the prohibition
in paragraph 1 of Article 4 upon discrimination, in time of public
emergency, based “solely” on the status of race, color, sex,
language, religion or social origin not to bar distinctions that may
have a disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular
status.301

Under international law, an understanding does not alter the
legal effect of a treaty provision but is used to explain how the
government will interpret the provision.302
The understanding does not insulate the United States
government from a finding that its immigration detention regime
violates the ICCPR. The decision to treat immigrants under
immigration law differently from all other detainees is not based on
a legitimate government objective, a point that comes out in the
Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court repeatedly notes that the
United States restricts immigrant rights in ways it would not be
allowed to restrict citizens’ rights not to achieve a particular policy
objective but because Congressional plenary power governs rather
than the Constitution. This is glaringly evident in the Court’s
conclusion that enemy combatant detention, which could capture
citizens and noncitizens alike, must comply with the Constitution’s
due process obligations, although it implicates the very war powers
and foreign affairs powers that help prop up Congressional plenary
power.303 The difference in source of power does not provide a
legitimate justification for the differential treatment of immigrants
in immigration proceedings when compared to all other potential
detainees. The harm from deprivation of liberty does not become
less because Congress is acting under sovereignty rights, nor do the
government’s interests grow stronger.
The Supreme Court further cannot hide behind precedent to
justify the differentiation. International law requires all states to
keep up with its changes.304 The Supreme Court acknowledges that
international law changes over time and that what violates

301

138 CONG. REC. 8,071 (1992).
DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 300, at 134.
303 See supra Part I(A).
304 According to the International Court of Justice, “the compatibility of an act with
international law can be determined only by reference to the law in force at the time when
the act occurred.” Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J.
99, ¶ 58 (Feb. 3).
302
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international law “must be gauged against the current state of
international law.”305 As such, it must apply IHRL to limit
immigration powers regardless of the weight of precedent.
The United States government, guided by the Supreme Court,
expressly and intentionally treats noncitizens facing the prospect of
immigration detention differently than all other persons facing all
other nonpunitive detention based on what it claims is allowed by
international law’s sovereignty rights. The reality, however, is that
international law does not allow for discrimination against
noncitizens or for circumscribed due process in detention
proceedings without adequately showing the differential treatment
is not arbitrary. The Supreme Court has never required the
government to make that showing, instead continuing to apply
international law as though it allows for absolute sovereignty. The
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressly
treats this failure as discrimination:
Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship
or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria
for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and
purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a
legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this
aim.306

The next section addresses how this failure to follow
international law is a result of the Supreme Court misconstruing
what it means for inherent sovereignty, or international law, to be
the main source of power.
A. Misconstruing the Source of Power
The Supreme Court’s rote recitation of precedents creating
Congressional plenary power over immigration ignores the decades
old limits to sovereignty rights the United States and the rest of the
international community adopted. The Court has made clear at
various points that without the weight of precedent, it would not
adopt Congressional plenary power given its obvious injustice.307 It
has never reconsidered what happens if the source of law sets new
limits on government power. In fact, the Court never seems to
305

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004).
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Gen. Recommendation 30,
Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, ¶ 4, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004).
307 See supra Part III(C).
306
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consider what it means for international law to be a source of power
at all.
The Supreme Court should treat international law as a source of
immigration powers consistent with the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy as applied to constitutional powers. The Court has been
nothing but clear since Marbury v. Madison that the limited
government established by the Framers of the Constitution has no
meaning unless government powers are in fact checked by the
Constitution and the courts:
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose
is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any
time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The
distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited
powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on
whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed,
are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be
contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act
repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution
by an ordinary act . . . . Certainly all those who have framed
written constitutions contemplate them as forming the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently
the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.308

But while international law, once the government consents to it,
is the source of federal immigration powers, the Supreme Court has
yet to consider whether international law also limits those powers.
It guarantees the powers international law confers on states without
also guaranteeing the limits international law places on those
powers. The Court allows Congressional legislation to simply
override the source of immigration powers, something the Marbury
passage makes clear it would never allow if that source was the
Constitution.309 This inconsistency creates grave incoherence in the
Court’s source of power jurisprudence.
The incoherence stems from how the Court attempts to reconcile
the Constitution’s grant of treaty powers to Congress and the
Executive with its decisions from the Chinese Exclusion Case to
308
309

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-77 (1803).
See id.
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Curtiss-Wright to elevate international law’s inherent sovereignty
over foreign affairs into a separate source of law. Ordinarily, the
Supreme Court allows an act of Congress to violate international
law. If the law is in the form of a treaty, congressional legislation
will override a treaty if it comes later in time and is clearly intended
to do so or there is no way to reconcile the statute and the treaty.310
According to the Court, Congress’ power to override international
treaties derives from Constitution Article VI, which lists both
treaties and federal legislation as the supreme law of the land, as
coequal forms of law, one is not inherently superior to the other.311
The Chinese Exclusion Case, in which the Supreme Court allowed
the Chinese Exclusion Act to override a treaty with China,
emphasized this point.312 Importantly, the Chinese Exclusion Case
never considers whether Congress can override a treaty that is
actually a source of law.
Even more glaring of a problem is that the Supreme Court does
not treat customary international law as a coequal form of law, but
rather as a gap filler. The Court will apply customary international
law only “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decisions.”313 As with treaties, the Court

310 See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 2122 (1963); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252
(1984).
311 See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“By the constitution, a treaty
is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both
are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy
is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will
always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without
violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will
control the other: provided always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is selfexecuting.”).
312 See Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case)
(“The treaties were of no greater legal obligation than the act of congress. By the
constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under the authority of the
United States, are both declared to be the supreme law of the land, and no paramount
authority is given to one over the other. A treaty, it is true, is in its nature a contract between
nations, and is often merely promissory in its character, requiring legislation to carry its
stipulations into effect. Such legislation will be open to future repeal or amendment. If the
treaty operates by its own force and relates to a subject within the power of congress, it
can be deemed in that particular only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or
modified at the pleasure of congress. In either case the last expression of the sovereign will
must control.”).
313 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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has not mulled the impact of establishing customary international
law as a source of immigration powers.314
These failures effectively misconstrue what it means to use
international law as a source of immigration power. In this instance,
international law is neither coequal to congressional legislation nor
a gap filler in the absence of any other immigration law, but is
coequal only to the Constitution. The Court intentionally placed
immigration powers derived from international law outside of
constitutional control when it established Congressional plenary
power. To allow Congress then to use its constitutional powers to
overturn the source of immigration authority would essentially (and
incredibly) make Congress the source of its own power. Congress
could both decide what powers it, and by delegation, the Executive
has and could choose what limits to apply to those powers. The
Supreme Court rejected similar efforts by the government in
Boumediene to avoid constitutional oversight when it detained
enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay, which, in the government’s
view, was outside the constitution’s territorial jurisdiction.315 The
Supreme Court refused to grant the “political branches . . . the
power to switch the Constitution on or off at will.”316 Allowing
ordinary congressional acts to override international law using
Congressional plenary power over immigration grants the
government the power to switch international law on and off at will
despite being the source of its power. International law is explicit
in how it is created, how a country consents to it, and how a country
revokes its consent. If international law is truly the source of power,
those rules would govern, not the Constitution. By ignoring its
precedent on what it means to be a source of power, the Supreme
Court is letting the federal government have its cake and eat it too.
Further, if federal immigration law is allowed to override
customary and treaty law based on inherent sovereignty rights,
international law would then justify the very discrimination it
prohibits. The Supreme Court is clear that noncitizens are entitled
to a right to liberty and to due process in the United States, but it
allows the government to limit or even wholly revoke those rights
based on powers given to it under international law that it then
mostly shields from judicial scrutiny using extraordinary deference.
314
315
316

See Ping, 130 U.S. at 600.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).
Id.
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In reality, the power to arbitrarily limit liberty and due process rights
no longer exists under international law. International law is not a
source for statutory construction but rather is the source of law. It
cannot then be used as a source for violating itself.
Part and parcel of sovereignty rights are the limits to those
rights, limits that the United States consented to, as evidenced by its
ratification of the ICCPR and CERD and by its constitutional and
legal practice that contributed to the development of customary
international law and jus cogens norms. In this instance, these limits
stand above Congressional acts, otherwise, the source of
immigration power is Congress, not international law. The failure
to construe international law as a source of law similarly to the
Constitution leads to an incoherence in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence and, more importantly, serious harm to noncitizens
deprived of their rights.
B. A Legal, Not Political, Question
International law and relations also do not offer a justification
for the extraordinary deference the Supreme Court employs to avoid
enforcing limits on Congressional plenary power over immigration,
regardless of the source of law. The Court claims that immigration
powers are a matter of foreign affairs and national security best left
to the discretion of the political branches of government and is
therefore subject to “special judicial review.”317 It claims to fear
that if it intervenes or allows lower courts to intervene in
immigration powers, even by giving immigrants the same rights
citizens receive, the Court could harm foreign relations and make
the federal government less nimble in addressing foreign affairs and
national security concerns.318 The Court’s rationale ignores that
international law treats human rights violations as legal, not political
matters, that it assigns the judiciary the role of safeguarding those
rights, and that using the government’s claims of foreign affairs and
national security powers to avoid its oversight responsibilities is not
just illogical but flies in the face of its decisions on enemy
combatant detention and other political question cases.

317

See supra Part III(B).
See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591 (1952); Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 57, 81-82 (1976).
318
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1. IHRL is a Legal, Not Political, Matter
If international law is a source of power on par with the
Constitution, the Court has failed to articulate a principled reason,
based in international law, for why it applies extraordinary
deference to immigration law and policy. Nor is it likely to find
one. To protect sovereignty to the greatest extent possible, the
international community specifically designed the IHRL system to
place responsibility on domestic governments to implement and
enforce IHRL requirements.319 The international community only
steps in if the violating state consents or if the human rights
violations that constitute a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression.”320
The international human rights treaties make clear that at all
times, the primary responsibility for human rights enforcement
belongs to the national governments and, more specifically, to the
judiciary in these countries. ICCPR Article 2 exemplifies this:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have
his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative
or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
remedies when granted.321

UDHR

Article

8

also

expressly

places

enforcement

319 See William M. Carter Jr., Rethinking Subsidiarity in Int’l Hum. Rts. Adjudication,
30 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 319, 319-22 (2008); U.N. Charter art. 39. Under the United
Nations Security Council’s Chapter VI powers, the Security Council may make
recommendations for the peaceful settlement of such threats, but intervention is limited to
its Chapter VII powers. U.N. Charter arts. 33-38.
320 U.N. Charter art. 39; see also, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome,
¶¶ 138-39 (Oct. 24, 2005).
321 ICCPR, supra note 254, art. 2(3); see also CERD, supra note 254, art. 6; see also
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 14, Dec. 10, 1984, T.I.A.S. 94-1120.1, 1465 U.N.T.S 85.
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responsibilities on domestic courts: “Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or
by law.”322 These provisions, like their corollary provisions in other
human rights treaties, including CERD, require state parties to
change their constitutions and legislation to conform to their human
rights obligations and to adopt any other necessary measures to
implement human rights. Most importantly for purposes of this
Article, it requires the government to ensure that anyone suffering
from a human rights violation has a legal remedy for that violation
that is “determined by competent judicial, administrative or
legislative authorities.” IHRL expressly places responsibility for
enforcing rights and remedying their violations on the domestic
courts of the countries that have consented to it.
The treaties explicitly reject that enforcement of human rights is
a political question and, instead, make it crystal clear that it is a legal
requirement. Human rights, accordingly, are not a matter of
politics, but a matter of law. The Human Rights Committee
explains that Article 2 and all other human rights provisions “are
binding on every State Party as a whole, including “[a]ll branches
of government (executive, legislative and judicial.)”323 It “attaches
importance to States Parties’ establishing appropriate judicial and
administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights
violations under domestic law.”324 The fact that the Senate deemed
the ICCPR and CERD non-self-executing is irrelevant. As
described in Part IV(A)(2) above, the ratification of the treaties
serves as consent to these provisions and now form part of the
source of law for immigration powers.325 Under international law
and the Supreme Court’s constitutional supremacy jurisprudence,
Congress does not need to adopt implementing legislation for them
to be binding.
The decision to abdicate its judicial responsibilities is not a
requirement of international law but rather is based on constitutional
separation of powers as described in Curtiss-Wright, which makes
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence only that much more incoherent.
If international law is the source of power, then it grants that power
322
323
324
325

UDHR, supra note 258, art. 8.
HRC No. 31, supra note 300, ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 15.
See supra Part IV(A)(2).
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to all branches of the federal government. It is illogical to say that
inherent sovereignty rights grant the federal government exclusive
power over immigration, separately from the Constitution, and then
say it does not grant the federal judiciary the power to enforce
constraints that are part of inherent sovereignty rights. How does
the federal government get all the powers but none of the
constraints? How does the Constitution divvy legislative and
enforcement powers over immigration, without also divvying
adjudication powers to the judiciary?
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 27,
which the United States has not ratified but is considered customary
international law, including by federal courts, prohibits states from
“invok[ing] the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty.”326 That means that under international
law, which is the source of immigration powers, the Supreme Court
cannot use the Constitution or its precedence to avoid implementing
the right to a remedy for human rights violations contained in the
treaties it has ratified.
The Supreme Court’s efforts to shield Congressional plenary
power from international law oversight through its extraordinary
deference to the political branches is also simply illogical.
International law is specifically designed to make conflict less
likely.327 To argue that the courts threaten foreign relations by
implementing international law, then, is disingenuous. Rather, the
failure of the courts to uphold limits on sovereignty rights derived
directly from obligations between states threatens foreign relations
and, at an extreme, war.
2. The Illogic and Inconsistencies of Extraordinary
Deference
To the extent that Congressional plenary power over
immigration derives from foreign affairs and national security
326 HRC No. 31, supra note 300, ¶ 4, 14. Similarly, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee makes clear that the ICCPR requires state parties to give “unqualified and
immediate effect” to the rights in the treaty and that a “failure to comply with this
obligation cannot be justified by reference to political, social, cultural or economic
considerations in the State.” See also Evan J. Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the L.
of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INTL L. 431, 434 (2004).
327 See U.N. Charter art. 55 (stating commitment “to the creation of conditions of
stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among
nations”).
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powers, shielding that power through extraordinary deference
makes no sense when applied to immigration law and policy that
applies to all noncitizens regardless of national origin. Much of the
deference to the political branches, and especially to the Executive,
is based on the idea that the President starts the day with confidential
national security briefings that may require her to act immediately
to protect the country.328 The Court’s claim that immigration law
and policy, when applied to all immigrants, is connected to foreign
affairs and national security powers seems specious given that much
of immigration law and policy on removal and detention does not
differentiate between noncitizens based on nationality, although
permission to enter may and special humanitarian visas certainly
do.329 The recognition that much of immigration law and policy is
a legal, not political, question does not deprive the government of
the ability to use detention (and deportation) in response to national
security threats or in emergency circumstances, a point the decisions
in Hamdi and Boumediene make clear. If the government chooses
to adopt immigration legislation that differentiates between

328 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) (“Unlike the President
and some designated members of Congress, neither the Members of this Court nor most
federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to
our Nation and its people. The law must accord the Executive substantial authority to
apprehend and detain those who pose a real danger to our security.”); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (“It is quite apparent that if, in the
maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment—perhaps serious
embarrassment—is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional
legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom
from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war.”);
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (“For reasons long recognized as valid, the
responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien
visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since
decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a
wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and
economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to
either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.”).
329 The limited exception to the lack of connection between removal proceedings and
foreign affairs may be when the United States government needs to identify a removal
destination when a noncitizen cannot be returned to her country of origin. See Jama v.
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005). The rules on detention and removal
apply regardless of nationality, even if the actual removal process may require some
foreign affairs negotiations.
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nationalities for foreign affairs or national security reasons, the
courts will consider its reasons as part of the weight of the
government’s interests in depriving noncitizens of their liberty or
other rights. Finally, it is hard to see how judicial decisions
enforcing constitutional and international law’s due process
requirements and anti-discrimination limits threaten foreign
relations or national security. The traditional justifications for
deference to the Executive or even Congress do not apply to
immigration law and policy that is not based on the specific context
of immigrants’ country of citizenship. Yet, the Court continues to
apply extraordinary deference when reviewing Congressional
plenary power over immigration without considering whether that
deference can be justified.330
Hamdi and Boumediene also make clear that foreign affairs and
national security powers (including war powers) are not immune
from meaningful judicial review. Rather, the connection to those
powers only requires the courts to give some deference to the
political branches, without permitting the federal government run
roughshod over detainee rights. These decisions should carry
serious weight in understanding the limits of foreign affairs and
national security deference since enemy combatant detention is
much more tightly connected to those powers than immigration
detention.
Notably, the Hamdi and Boumediene decisions form part of a
more recent Supreme Court trend outside of immigration law and
policy that is undermining the continued treatment of foreign affairs
and national security as a political matter. Scholars mark the end of
the Cold War as the point at which the Court began to apply greater
constitutional limits to these powers.331 The Court continues to
retain deference to the political branches, but not to the point that
foreign affairs and national security matters are effectively
nonjusticiable, as is often the case with immigration law and

330 See, e.g., Elad D. Gil, Totemic Functionalism in Foreign Affairs Law, 10 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 316, 323 (2019) (“Functionalism is an interpretive approach that asks what
interpretation— here, of the Constitution’s separation-of-powers scheme—would make
the challenged policy or act work best. Judicial deference is thus functionally desired when
in a given context it facilitates better results than judicial involvement. But what has played
out in practice is that judges often cite the executive’s special competence in foreign affairs
as a sort of heuristic for applying a de facto presumption of near-total deference.”)
331 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 229, at 1900-01.
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policy.332 The Guantanamo detention cases were remarkable
because the strength of the connection between the issue at hand and
foreign affairs/national security powers did not lead the Court to
apply extraordinary deference.
The Supreme Court bolstered its effort to limit its deference on
foreign affairs matters in Zivotosky v. Clinton.333 It refused to apply
the political question doctrine to the issue of whether the State
Department must list on a United States passport an American
citizen’s birthplace as “Jerusalem, Israel” when requested under a
federal statute.334
State Department policy required listing
“Jerusalem” in recognition that sovereignty over the city was the
subject of peace negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian
representatives.335 The District Court of DC had determined it could
not rule on the issue because it would “require the Court[s] to
‘decide the political status of Jerusalem.’”336 The Court disagreed,
finding instead that it is only being asked to determine whether
Zivotofsky “may vindicate his statutory right,” which required
statutory interpretation and a determination of the constitutionality
of the statute.337 The Court concluded that the Executive cannot
employ the political question doctrine unless it is “being asked to
supplant a foreign policy decision of the political branches with the
courts’ own unmoored determination of what United States policy
toward Jerusalem should be.”338 Rather, it is being asked to
determine the constitutionality of a statute, which is “emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department,” a duty the “courts
cannot avoid . . . merely ‘because the issues have political
implications.’”339
While Zivotofsky is about the political question doctrine, which
is no longer used in immigration law and policy, the rationale for
why immigration law and policy is not a political matter rests on the
same determination the Court made in the Zivotofsky case. Judicial
review of generally applicable immigration law and policy, law and
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339

Id. at 1935.
566 U.S. 189 (2012).
Id. at 194-96.
Id. at 191-92.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 195.
Clinton, 566 U.S. at 196.
Id.
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policy that does not differentiate by nationality, does not require the
Court to supplant the federal government’s foreign policy decisions.
As noted earlier in this section, there is nothing about generally
applicable immigration law and policy that touches on foreign
policy.
Importantly, the Supreme Court initially established
immigration law and policy as tightly connected to foreign affairs
and national security in cases involving the Chinese Exclusion Act,
starting with the Chinese Exclusion Case. Cases challenging the
constitutionality of the legislation certainly were directly tied to
foreign affairs and, in its pernicious xenophobia, to national
security. Directly at stake was the United States’ relationship with
China. Rightly or wrongly, the fact that the statute targeted a
particular country’s citizens at least draws some connection to the
political powers the Court employs to justify deference. The Court
relies on these cases as precedent to continue its deference on
immigration matters although the generally applicable immigration
law and policy lacks that connection.340
When the Supreme Court attached immigration law and policy
to foreign affairs and national security powers, it created a loophole
to ensure that the federal government has little accountability for its
human and civil rights abuses in the immigration arena. To continue
to uphold this position is to shirk its responsibilities, violate
international law, and to allow the United States to violate
immigrant rights with impunity. As Part IV shows, the Court is
effectively allowing nothing but the weight of precedent to justify
340 The citations for foreign affairs extraordinary deference directly or indirectly lead
back to Chinese Exclusion Act cases, particularly Fong Yue Ting. For example, the Court
in Trump v. Hawaii cited to Mathews v. Diaz in support of its deference to the political
branches. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2418-19 (2018). Mathews v. Diaz cites to
Fong Yue Ting, Harisiades v. Shaughnessey and Kleindienst v. Mandel. Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976). Harisiades v. Shaughnessy cites to Curtiss-Wright, which
cites to Fong Yue Ting to support treating immigration law and policy as part of foreign
relations. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 n.16 (1952); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). Kleindienst v. Mandel does not
specifically cite a case for the extraordinary deference it grants Congress, although it cites
to the Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting for absolute Congressional plenary
Power. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1972). Fiallo v. Bell also cites
directly to Fong Yue Ting, as well as to Mathews v. Diaz. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977). The point of this exercise is to show that the decision to grant such extraordinary
deference and, initially, make immigration law and policy nonjusticiable as a political
question fundamentally comes from Chinese Exclusion Act cases that are directly tied to
foreign affairs and, wrongly, rhetorically tied to national security.
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violations of constitutional and international law, leading to a gross
unfairness to noncitizens in immigration proceedings.
VI.

Conclusion
Immigrant rights activists have struggled for decades with little
success to overturn unjust immigration law and policy as
unconstitutional. While noncitizens in the United States benefit
from constitutional rights overall, the Supreme Court stripped them
of meaningful constitutional protections when facing immigration
proceedings as part of its effort to locate a source for a monopoly of
federal power over immigration. When the Court landed on
international law’s sovereignty rights as the primary source of
power, it relied on absolute sovereignty to establish Congressional
plenary power. It then employed extraordinary deference to
Congress and the Executive on foreign affairs and national security
matters to avoid all but the barest judicial review.
The Supreme Court continues to resist constitutional rights
arguments, which suggests that the best avenue for undoing
Congressional plenary power over immigration and the injustice it
creates is to target its deteriorating foundation in inherent
sovereignty rights and foreign affairs and national security powers.
Absolute sovereignty rights no longer exist and the Court has
curtailed its deference to the political branches on other foreign
affairs and national security matters, yet the Court’s jurisprudence
on immigration law and policy remains frozen in time. International
law to which the United States has consented cannot justify human
rights violations that it does not permit. Nor can the Court employ
its constitutional jurisprudence that treaties are equal to
Congressional legislation and that customary international law is
inferior to that legislation to override a source of power. To do so
would effectively treat Congress as the source of its own power, a
legal impossibility. Continuing to rely on its absolute plenary
power jurisprudence that predates the United States’ consent to
international human rights law is the equivalent of relying on
jurisprudence that predates a constitutional amendment intended to
overturn that very jurisprudence.
Further, the Supreme Court’s continued claim that immigration
law and policy is a foreign affairs and national security matter
entitled to extraordinary deference is a woeful misunderstanding of
international law and its obligations and is grossly out of step with
the Court’s post-9/11 jurisprudence. International human rights law
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requires states provide a domestic legal remedy for all human rights
violations. And, at least since 9/11, the Court has rejected the
federal government’s efforts to claim extraordinary deference when
it uses its national security and foreign affairs powers to incapacitate
enemy combatants. Continuing to employ this deference leads to
the absurd result that in some important respects enemy combatants
bent on the destruction of the United States are entitled to greater
due process and liberty rights than noncitizens in immigration
proceedings.
The Supreme Court allows Congress, and by extension, the
Executive to violate noncitizens’ rights to liberty, due process, nondiscrimination, and equality under the law, not because of deep
considerations of the source of immigration powers or of the need
to limit the rights of noncitizens because of weighty government
interests, but simply because it always has. It is long past time for
the Supreme Court to wholesale reevaluate its outdated rulings and
incoherent logic that continue to allow the government to commit
gross injustices against noncitizens in immigration proceedings. It
is long past time for the Supreme Court to stop shirking its
responsibilities and provide oversight of immigration powers as
required by international law and the Constitution.

